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I. INTRODUCTION
P ublic employee labor in the United States has had a history quite
different from that of labor in the private sector.' For example, while
private sector employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements
only now are gaining the right to be free from discharge at the will of
their employers,2 public employees have had civil service protection since
the late nineteenth Century and have also had certain constitutional pro-
tections.3 Acceptance of the use of economic strikes has also differed. At
the same time as the Roosevelt administration was actively protecting
private sector unionization, including the right to strike, thereby provid-
ing the impetus for a dramatic increase in private sector union member-
ship, President Roosevelt expressed adamant opposition to strikes by
For general history of private sector labor, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, BULLETIN 10000, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1976)
[hereinafter cited as BRIEF HISTORY].
C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 115-79 (1983).
1 See infra note 111.
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public employees.' Finally, while the pace of private sector unionization
has decelerated to the point of reversal in recent years,5 public sector
unionization has dramatically increased, both in terms of absolute num-
bers of members and in terms of the percentage of public sector employ-
ees belonging to unions.6
These facts provide an indication that there may be fundamental dif-
ferences between public and private sector employment. At the same
time, however, they reveal at least one striking similarity-the depen-
dency of unionization upon favorable governmental policies.
Thus, while part of the growth in numbers of public sector union mem-
bers is due simply to the rapid recent growth of the public sector itself,
the growth in the unionization rate is due to the positive response of
many public entities to unionization. Since 1959, when Wisconsin became
the first state to enact a public employee bargaining bill, thirty-nine
states have passed similar measures,' and the federal government has rec-
In a 1937 letter to the President of the National Federation of Federal Employees,
President Roosevelt said: "A strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an in-
tent on their part to obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satis-
fied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to
support it[,] is unthinkable and intolerable." Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public
Employee?, 1 LAB. L.J. 604, 612 (1950)(quoting letter from Franklin Roosevelt to President
of National Federation of Federal Employees (Aug. 16, 1937)). This statement was in accor-
dance with the traditional view that collective bargaining and the corresponding right to
strike in the public sector were antithetical to the doctrine of sovereign authority. Two other
presidents have delivered sweeping condemnations of the notion that public employees
should be permitted to engage in strike activity against the sovereign. President Wilson
characterized the 1919 Boston police strike as "'an intolerable crime against civilization.' "
Vogel, supra, at 612 (quoting Wilson); then-Governor Coolidge, when he refused to rein-
state the Boston policemen who had struck in 1919, declared, "'It]here is no right to strike
against public safety by anybody anywhere at any time.'" Id. (quoting Coolidge).
6 During the fiscal year 1982, there were only 3,929 representation elections conducted
by the National Labor Relations Board, the lowest total in almost twenty years. Of these,
unions won only 1,668, again the lowest total in almost twenty years. NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD, N.L.R.B. ELECTION REPORT, ER-250 (Nov. 18, 1983). The percentage of union
members in the civilian work force declined from 38.1% in 1956 to 22.3% in 1978, and to
17.9% in 1982. DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 1984-85 EDITION BNA 2 (1984);
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULLETIN 2070, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 412 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS].
' The number of state and local governmental employees in April, 1957 was 5,608,000
while in October, 1979, it was 13,102,000. HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, at
201. The percentage of organized employees in state and local government went from 28%
in 1972 to 49% by 1980. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 1980 SPECIAL STUDIES No. 88 (1981); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 1976, SPECIAL
STUDIES No. 88 (1978); HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 400-09.
1 R. LARSON, T. BUMPASS, K. ASHMUS & D. WARD, PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING: THE OHIO SYSTEM 1-5 1984 [hereinafter cited as R. LARSON & T. BUMPASS]; Mulcahy &
Ruesch, Wisconsin's Municipal Labor Law: A Need for Change, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 105
(1980); 1 PUBLIC EMPLOYER BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 600 (June 1978).
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ognized collective bargaining.' While most of this legislative activity oc-
curred during the 1960s and 1970s, the strong Democratic showing in the
nonpresidential election year of 1982 provided a climate for passage of
major new laws in Illinois and Ohio.'
These statutes were enacted against a background of both actual expe-
rience in other states and a considerable body of legal thought about pub-
lic employee bargaining. The purpose of this Article is to examine the
Ohio Act in terms of its accommodation of the major theoretical consider-
ations in favor of, or opposed to, public sector collective bargaining. In
other words, is the Ohio Act structured so as maximally to achieve the
benefits asserted to be available from collective bargaining and to avoid
the costs asserted to arise from it?
In order to accomplish this task, this Article will briefly summarize ma-
jor provisions of the Act. An overview of some of the major arguments for
and against public sector unionization will then be provided. Once this
background has been established, the Act will be analyzed, focusing upon
its effect upon individual employees, labor organizations, and the demo-
cratic process. The conclusions reached are that the Act is not structured
so as to protect public employees to the degree that private sector em-
ployees are protected, that the Act will assist labor organizations, and
that the Act strikingly fails to provide a structure that can minimize
damage to the processes of democracy.
II. PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
A. Background of Legislative and Judicial Actions
Until the passage of the Act, Ohio's public employee labor relations
were governed primarily by two relatively short and simple statutes: 1)
the Ferguson Act, chapter 4117 of the Revised Code, which prohibited
strikes and provided severe penalties for those individuals who did par-
ticipate in a strike; and 2) section 9.41 of the Code, which authorized
public employers to allow dues checkoffs for labor organizations. In the
early seventies, a public sector labor law, backed by Governor John J.
Gilligan and closely patterned after Pennsylvania's Public Employees Re-
' Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Compilation), revoked, Exec. Order
No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1974), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 app. at 793 (1982). This was a
comprehensive order which guaranteed the right to negotiate a written contract, established
election procedures and unfair labor practices, contained a strong management rights clause,
placed wages and hours outside the scope of collective bargaining, and established advisory
arbitration for grievances. The order has been superceded by the Federal Labor Relations
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966)(current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-71035
(1982)).
' ILL. ANN, STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1601-1627 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.01-.23 (Page Supp. 1983).
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lation Act, 10 was introduced in the General Assembly." For a variety of
reasons, however, the bill never left the Committee on Agriculture, Com-
merce and Labor." In 1975, a comprehensive public employee bargaining
bill, Senate Bill 70, was passed by the General Assembly but vetoed by
Governor James A. Rhodes. 3 The legislature again attempted to grant
public employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively with
public employers in 1977.1" This effort failed when Governor Rhodes ve-
toed Senate Bill 222.18
Throughout this period, however, the judiciary limited some of the ear-
lier doctrines that had hindered public employee unionization, such as
the notion that a public employer could not enter into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with its employees. In Dayton Classroom Teachers As-
sociation v. Dayton Board of Education,"6 the Ohio Supreme Court held
that public employers could meet and negotiate binding collective bar-
gaining agreements with groups of workers. At the same time, however,
the court reaffirmed the principle that public employees had no constitu-
tional right to require their employers to bargain collectively. Yet, even
without the benefit of legal compulsion, public employee bargaining was
taking place in Ohio, and, even with the official prohibition of strikes
contained in the Ferguson Act, 8 public employee strikes occurred fre-
quently.'9 Additionally, civil service and constitutional due process pro-
tections effectively prohibited public employers from discharging public
employees for engaging in non-strike union activity. Ohio public employ-
ees were thus, in practice, able to enjoy many of the same rights as those
provided to employees in the private sector.
On January 8, 1983, Governor Richard Celeste came to office promising
a public employee bargaining bill. Senate Bill 133, sponsored by Senator
Eugene Branstool (D-Utica) and encouraged by the Celeste administra-
tion, was introduced in the Ohio Senate on March 17, 1983." The mea-
sure, affecting nearly 580,000 state, county, and local workers," cleared
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
" H. B. 881, 109th Gen. Assembly, 134 Ohio H.J. 348 (1971).
" 143 Ohio H.J. 837 (1971).
,3 S.B. 70, 111th Gen. Assembly, 136 Ohio S.J. 1179, 1197 (1975).
' S.B. 222, 112th Gen. Assembly, 137 Ohio S.J. 312 (1977).
'" 137 Ohio S.J. 1359 (1978).
10 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 132, 323 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1975).
17 Id.
"s OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980).
'" There were 56 public sector strikes in the twelve months ending in October of 1980.
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, RELEASE CB 82-4, 1/13/82.
0 S.B. 133, 115th Gen. Assembly, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 3-16 (Baldwin).
" Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 208, (Oct. 26, 1983). The Act does not apply to munic-
ipal corporations and townships with populations of under 5,000. See OHio REV CODE ANN
§ 4117.01(E)(Page Supp. 1983). Thus, the number of public employees affected by the Act
may be less than the number of employees referenced in the text.
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the Senate virtually untouched on April 21, 1983: it then was sent to the
House of Representatives, and, after certain changes, was reported out by
the House Commerce and Labor Committee on June 21, 1983.22 Nine
days later, after bitter debate and some behind-the-scenes amendments,
the House passed the bill." On the same day, the Senate approved the
House version of the bill.2 On July 6, 1983 Governor Celeste signed into
law Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 133 (the "Act").25
The Act, which for the most part took effect on April 1, 1984, is lengthy
and complicated. Among other things, it grants to Ohio's public employ-
ees a qualified right to strike and imposes upon public employers a duty
to bargain with labor organizations that have been certified as representa-
tives of a majority of employees in appropriate units. While it is not the
purpose of this Article to analyze each section of the Act,2" a summary of
its major points follows as a prelude to the analysis described earlier.
B. The Administrative Framework of the Act
1. The State Employment Relations Board
The Act is administered by a State Employment Relations Board, com-
prised of three persons appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the
Senate for staggered six-year terms."' These members serve on a full-time
basis; no more than two of them may belong to the same political party,
and each of them must have knowledge and experience in either person-
nel or labor relations.2
8
The principal functions of SERB are: (1) to resolve questions and con-
troversies concerning claims for recognition by public employee organiza-
tions; (2) to investigate and, when necessary, hear and remedy claims that
unfair labor practices have been committed; (3) to create and oversee a
Bureau of Mediation designed to assist public employers and labor orga-
nizations when their negotiations reach an impasse; (4) to make determi-
nations regarding certain aspects of public employee strikes; and (5) to
collect and serve as a clearing-house for information about public employ-
ees' wages, hours, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employ-
22 Id.
2- Id.
2" Id.
" Am. Sub. S.B. 133, 115th Gen. Assembly, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237 (Baldwin).
While the effective date of the Act was October 6, 1983, the substantive provisions regarding
recognition, bargaining, impasse resolution, and strikes did not go into effect until April 1,
1984. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.05-.10, .11-.23 (Page Supp. 1983).
2 For a detailed analysis of the Act, see R. LARSON & T. BUMPASS, supra note 7.
" Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(A)(Page Supp. 1983). The initial terms of office are
one, two, and three years respectively.
22 Id.
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ment, and to act as qualified mediators and factfinders.
In order to carry out these functions, SERB is vested with the power to
hold hearings and administer oaths, examine witnesses and documents,
and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the pro-
duction of records.2 SERB is also empowered to adopt rules and regula-
tions to carry out the purposes of the Act.1°
2. The Public Employer Negotiators
The Act established a three-tiered system for the negotiation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements by the state's public employers. The Office of
Collective Bargaining, a subdivision of the Department of Administrative
Services, negotiates collective bargaining agreements on behalf of state
agencies, departments, boards, and commissions."1 Other state elected of-
ficials, and boards of trustees of state institutions of higher education are
charged with individual responsibility for their respective negotia-
tions-although they may elect to use the services of the Office of Collec-
tive Bargaining.3 2 Finally, officials at the local level are to negotiate their
own collective bargaining agreements; the Act does not permit them to
designate the Office of Collective Bargaining as their bargaining
representative.
3. The Personnel Board of Review
Prior to the Act's implementation, the Personnel Board of Review
(PBR) served as the sole tribunal for the adjudication of disputes be-
29 Id. § 4117.02(H)(3); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-1-09(D) (1984).
* OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(H)(8)(Page Supp. 1983). The manner in which SERB
exercises this power will play a significant role in the Act's evolution. SERB may eventually
choose to generate detailed substantive rules to govern the most critical labor relations and
collective bargaining situations, or it may simply use its rule-making power to fine-tune
procedures under the Act and allow individual disputes to generate their own substantive
rules. If the federal experience and the practices in states with similar acts are any indica-
tion of what will happen in Ohio, SERB will choose the latter course. SERB's initial rules
follow that format, being mostly procedural. OHoI ADMIN. CODE 4117-1-01 to -25-02 (1984).
With respect to the National Labor Relations Board's rule-making power, see Bernstein,
The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Perform-
ance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968).
3' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(D)(Page Supp. 1983). In addition to its principal
function of negotiating collective bargaining agreements on behalf of state-level public em-
ployers, the Office of Collective Bargaining is charged with a number of other duties. These
include: 1) assisting the Director of Administrative Services in formulating management's
philosophy and strategies for collective bargaining; 2) coordinating state efforts in media-
tion, factfinding, and arbitration cases; 3) coordinating the completion of data needed for
negotiations; and 4) reporting to the Governor and the General Assembly on the implemen-
tation of the Act and its impact on the state. Id.
32 Id.
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tween employees and the state over the terms and conditions of classified
state service jobs. The PBR was a subdivision of the Department of Ad-
ministrative Services, and was vested with exclusive and plenary power to
hear appeals of final decisions of appointing authorities or the Director of
Administrative Services concerning reductions in a classified service em-
ployee's pay or grade, job abolishment or other employment termination,
reassignment or nonreassignment, or classification or reclassification. 3
Under the new statutory scheme, the PBR's duties remain the same;
however, its reporting relationship, and likely its caseload, have been
changed. Under the Act, the PBR is considered to be part of SERB for
administrative purposes-although by express proviso, there is no line of
appeal from a PBR ruling to SERB.34 The more significant change is
likely to lie in the number of appeals which the PBR will hear. The Act
requires inclusion of a grievance procedure in collective bargaining agree-
ments and specifies that, in the event that this procedure includes bind-
ing arbitration as its final step, arbitration must be used and there can be
no resort by either party to the PBR.3 5 Thus, the jurisdiction of the PBR
will become residual; it will hear only those appeals involving either clas-
sified employees who are exempt from the Act's coverage or classified em-
ployees who, although covered by the Act, are not subject to collective
bargaining agreements that provide for the ultimate step of binding griev-
ance arbitration."e
The Act also forecloses appeals to local civil service commissions in
cases involving discipline for employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements containing arbitration clauses.
37
11 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 124.03 (Page 1978)(amended by the Act effective as of De-
cember 5, 1983).
Id. § 124.05 (Page 1984)(effective as of December 5, 1983).
35 Id. § 4117.10(A)(Page Supp. 1983).
11 This provision will result in nonexempt employees (and their employers) whose agree-
ments specify binding arbitration as the ultimate grievance step for the issue in question
having the benefit of the presumably more expeditious procedures set forth in their agree-
ments. Where the grievance procedure lacks this final step, or where the issue in question is
not subject to the procedure, concurrent jurisdiction and the possibility of "forum-shop-
ping" between the Board and the contractual grievance procedure may inject unnecessary
confusion into the dispute resolution process.
" OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 4117.10(A)(Page Supp. 1983). The Act prevails over other
conflicting laws, resolutions, or provisions with certain limited exceptions. See id. Collective
bargaining agreements govern wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for all
employees covered by them. For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 204-06.
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C. Certification of Appropriate Bargaining Units
1. Certification
The Act accords to public employees the right to be represented in col-
lective negotiations by the employee organizations of their choice. Certifi-
cation of a bargaining representative may be obtained in either of two
ways. First, the employee organization, if it believes that it has been se-
lected by a majority of public employees to be their representative, may
seek voluntary recognition by filing a formal request with the employer
and sending a copy of the request to SERB.38 The request must describe
the bargaining unit and be supported by substantial evidence that a ma-
jority of the employees in the proposed unit have selected the employee
organization as their exclusive bargaining representative.
3 9
Upon receipt of the request, the public employer may refuse to recog-
nize the employee organization and may request a Board-conducted elec-
tion.4 0 Where, however, the public employer does not doubt the union's
majority status and does not dispute the appropriateness of the proposed
bargaining unit, the employer must immediately inform SERB and the
affected employees that a request for recognition has been made.41 The
employer must also advise its employees that any objections to certifica-
tion of the organization must be filed with SERB within twenty-one days
58 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(Page Supp. 1983).
39 Id.
10 Id. Franklin Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. T 1308
(SERB Nov. 7, 1984). In Franklin, SERB went beyond simply deciding that an employer's
election petition precluded the issuance of a certification without an election. SERB dis-
cussed the procedures that would be set in motion upon the filing of an employer's petition
for an election. A hearing on the employer's election petition would be held in which the
issue would be whether a question of representation exists. "[Tihe petitioning employer has
the burden of proving the existence of a representation issue by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id. at 235. Surprisingly, SERB then stated that the employer's proof of the exis-
tence of a representation issue would fail if the employer "fails to show that substantial
questions exist respecting the appropriateness of the unit or introduces no evidence to
demonstrate that that basis of the union claim of majority status is without foundation." Id.
In light of the language of section 4117.07(A)(2) dealing with the filing of employer peti-
tions, a question of representation would by definition be present whenever a union has
presented a claim of majority status, whether by a voluntary recognition petition under sec-
tion 4117.05, or otherwise. Should SERB certify a union without an election in spite of the
filing of an employee petition, it would be in the paradoxical position of saying that there is
no question of representation for purposes of an election but that there is a question of
representation for purposes of SERB's issuance of the certification order in the voluntary
recognition proceeding.
" The employer must inform the employees by posting a notice at their place of em-
ployment. Each notice must reveal the name of the organization seeking to represent the
employees, the date of the recognition request, and a description of the proposed unit. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a)-(b).
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of the date of the request for recognition."2
SERB is required to certify the organization as the exclusive bargaining
agent of employees in the bargaining unit on the twenty-second day after
the filing of the request for recognition unless an election has been de-
manded by the employer within twenty-one days of the request or unless
SERB has received substantial evidence that: 1) the proposed bargaining
unit is inappropriate; 2) a majority of the employees in the proposed unit
do not wish to be represented by the organization which filed the request;
or 3) at least ten percent of the employees in the unit wish to be repre-
sented by another employee organization. '
The second route to certification is by secret ballot election. An elec-
tion petition may be filed by an employee, a group of employees, an em-
ployee organization acting on their behalf, or an employer." Where a pe-
tition is filed by employees or an employee organization, the petition
must contain a statement that thirty percent of the employees in the pro-
posed bargaining unit desire to be represented by an exclusive represen-
tative for the purpose of collective bargaining.45 After conducting an in-
vestigation and, if necessary, a hearing, SERB may direct an election in a
unit which it has determined is appropriate for bargaining. If the em-
ployee organization receives a majority of the votes cast, the Board will
certify it as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in
the unit."
2. Appropriate Bargaining Units
Under any orderly procedure for resolving disputes over recognition of
an employee organization, a question of utmost importance is whether the
group of employees the organization seeks to represent is an appropriate
bargaining unit. The scope of the unit determined to be appropriate may
significantly affect both the ability of a petitioning employee organization
to win an election and the effectiveness of any subsequent bargaining
and/or strikes that take place.
The Act provides that SERB is charged with selecting an appropriate
unit for collective bargaining; "7 however, SERB is not required to select
the most appropriate or the best unit."' In discharging its responsibilities,
SERB is directed under the Act to consider a variety of factors, including:
the existence of a community of interest among employees; the history of
- Id.
4 Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(i)-(iv).
4 Id. § 4117.07(A)(1)-(2).
45 Id. § 4117.07(A)(1).
46 Id. § 4117.07(C)(3).
47 Id. § 4117.06(A).
48 Id. § 4117.06(C).
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collective bargaining; the effect of "over-fragmentation"; "' the adminis-
trative structure of the public employer; the wages, hours, and other
working conditions of the public employees; and the desires of the
employees.50
Although the Ohio legislature conferred upon SERB broad discretion in
defining units appropriate for collective bargaining, the Act does limit
that discretion in several important respects."' In addition to completely
excluding certain classes of employees from coverage and, therefore, from
inclusion in a bargaining unit,"3 the Act also specifies that SERB may mix
certain categories of employees in the same unit either not at all or only
in certain narrowly prescribed situations.5 3
The Act provides that SERB's unit determination may not be ap-
pealed.5' However, it is not clear whether this proscription may be
4, But see In re Corrections, Law Enforcement and Safety Employees of Ohio, Local
740, No. 84-RC-05-0924 (SERB May 1, 1985).
50 OHIO REV. ConE ANN. § 4117.06(B)(Page Supp. 1983).
51 In addition, SERB, as a matter of its own policy, has decided that "[n]o petition for
unilateral clarification or amendment in a deemed certified, 'voluntarily recognized,' or
'agreed' unit will be entertained unless made during the window period and directed at the
exclusion of statutorily proscribed classification." In re Akron Educ. Assoc., No. 84-UC-10-
2130, p.2 (SERB June 14, 1985).
82 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)(1)-(14).
83 Section 4117.06(D) provides that SERB may not include in a unit with other employ-
ees guards or correction officers at penal or mental institutions or any public employee em-
ployed as a security guard. Id. § 4117.06(D)(2). A unit including both professional and non-
professional employees is deemed to be inappropriate unless both a majority of the
professional employees and a majority of the nonprofessional employees vote for inclusion in
such a unit. Id. § 4117.06(D)(1). SERB may not certify a unit that mixes uniformed mem-
bers of the police or fire department or members of the State Highway Patrol with other
classifications of public employees in those departments. Id. § 4117.06(D)(3). Members of a
police department with the rank of sergeant or above must also be separated from members
below that rank. Id. § 4117.06(D)(6). See In re Fraternal Order of Police and City of Love-
land, 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. 1 2340 (SERB March 28, 1985). Additionally, SERB is
prohibited from placing the employees of more than one institution of higher education
together or from establishing a unit that would be inconsistent with the accreditation stan-
dards of an institution. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(4). Finally, SERB may not designate
a unit which includes employees under the jurisdiction of more than one county elected
official unless the elected official and the Board of County Commissioners approve such a
unit. Id. § 4117.06(D)(5). SERB has given indications that it will apply these restrictions
flexibility so as to avoid nonsensical results or results that are inconsistent with the general
statutory mandates. For example, in Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Seneca
County Sheriff, 1 OHIO Pus. EMPLOYEE REmP. 11202 (SERB Sept. 28, 1984), SERB ordered a
nonuniformed dispatcher included in a unit with uniformed deputy sheriffs. While SERB
had to strain for a legal justification for doing so in light of § 4117.06(D)(3), the result
avoided a vestigial classification. Since dispatchers, as well as members of police depart-
ments, are prohibited from striking and are able to go to conciliation, the decision makes
sense. Cf. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Reading, 1 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. 1063,
1070, 1071 (SERB July 12, 1984)(only civilian clerk included in unit with dispatchers in
order to avoid overfragmentation).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(A)(Page Supp. 1983)("[SERB's] determination is fi-
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avoided through a refusal to bargain which would present the issue to a
court for review." If neither such an appeal nor the remedy of mandamus
is available, the constitutionality of this aspect of the Act may be in
doubt.56
D. Bargaining Obligation and Procedures
The Act defines bargaining collectively as the obligation of public em-
ployers and employee representatives to negotiate in good faith at reason-
able times and places with respect to terms and conditions of employ-
ment with the intention of reaching an agreement.5 7 The Act's definition
also includes the duty to execute any agreement reached and the qualifi-
cation that a party is not required to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.5"
Where there is no preexisting agreement, either the public employer or
the employee representative may serve notice to the other and to SERB
offering to meet for a period of ninety days with the other party in order
to negotiate an agreement. 9 Where a collective bargaining agreement is
already in existence, either party may invoke the duty to bargain by serv-
ing written notice to the other party and to SERB of the proposed termi-
nation or modification of the existing agreement or of a proposed succes-
sor agreement. This notice must be served no less than sixty days before
the termination date of the existing agreement or, where there is no such
date, sixty days before the proposal is intended to become effective.6 0
The parties to the negotiations may choose between a statutory im-
passe resolution mechanism or any other agreed method, which will then
override the statutory procedures. To take this second course of action,
nal and conclusive and not appealable to the court.").
" Under the National Labor Relations Act an employer may obtain judicial review of
the propriety of the NLRB's unit determination by raising the issue as a defense in a refusal
to bargain charge. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941); American
Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
16 In Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp., 266
Ind, 491, 499-507, 365 N.E.2d 752, 756-60 (1977), the Supreme Court of Indiana held that
the Indiana Public Employment Relations Act violated the state's constitution because it
precluded judicial review of unit determinations made by an administrative agency. Id. at
507, 365 N.E.2d at 756-60.
17 OHIO REv. COoE ANN. § 4117.01(G)(Page Supp. 1983).
" Id.
49 Id. § 4117.14(B)(2).
80 Id. § 4117.14(B)(1)(a).
" See, e.g., In re City of Columbus, 2 OHIo Pus. EMPLOYEE REP- 12125 (SERB February
6, 1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, No. 85-CV-02-797 (C.P. Franklin County 1985), on
remand, 2 OHIO Pus. EMPLOYEE REP. 1 2383 (SERB March 20, 1985). In City of Columbus
SERB indicated that an agreement to engage in mediation is not sufficient to constitute a
mutually agreed dispute resolution procedure ("MAD") because mediation lacks finality.
Writing for the Board, Chairman Day stated the following:
The statute is quite clear that supersession becomes a factor only when there is an
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the parties may, at any time prior to forty-five days before the expiration
date of the applicable collective bargaining period, agree upon any mech-
anism for resolving an impasse in negotiations.2 The Act enumerates
some of the possibilities available, most of them having to do with forms
of arbitration.
The statutory impasse resolution procedure is complex. If, at or after
fifty days prior to the expiration of the bargaining period, the parties
have not reached an agreement, either party may request that SERB in-
tervene and determine whether both parties have indeed been bargaining
collectively. 3 If an impasse exists, or if the bargaining period for the par-
ties will expire in forty-five days, SERB will appoint a mediator, selected
either from its own Bureau of Mediation or from the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, to assist the parties.6 4
If the mediator determines that his assistance cannot break the im-
passe and so notifies SERB, or if no agreement has been reached by
thirty-one days prior to the end of the bargaining period, SERB is re-
quired to appoint a factfinding panel.6 5 In essence, the panel engages in
advisory arbitration, though it may elect to mediate at any time during
the factfinding process. Within fourteen days of its appointment, the
panel must issue its findings of fact and recommendations-unless the
parties stipulate to an extension." The panel's recommendations are
deemed agreed upon if neither the members of the labor organization nor
the employer's governing legislative body rejects the recommendations by
a three-fifths vote of their respective total membership within seven days
after service of the recommendations."7 If either party rejects the recom-
mendations, they are published for such influence on public opinion as
alternative settlement procedure which the parties have mutually agreed upon.
The statutory purpose obviously contemplates finality. That prerequisite to a su-
persession of the statutory impasse procedure is not present in the instant case.
2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. at 85 (emphasis in original). This case involved safety forces
prohibited by statute from striking, and the supposed MAD was no more than a provision
contained in a pre-Act collective bargaining agreement, so that its result is perhaps defensi-
ble. However, the statute says nothing about frmality; indeed, it specifically does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or make any concessions in bargaining. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4117.01(G). All the statute requires of a MAD is that the parties agree to it, and that
it does not itself require or permit unfair labor practices (i.e. a safety forces' MAD could not
authorize the union to engage in a strike).
62 Id. § 4117.14(C)
63 Id. § 4117.14(C)(2).
64 Id.
65 Id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
-8 Id. § 4117.14(C)(5).
67 Id. § 4117.14(C)(6). If read literally, this provision would seem to require that each
bargaining unit have a separate labor organization. Otherwise, nonbargaining unit persons
who are members of the labor organization would be able to vote on the factfinding panel's
recommendations. The Board's rules, however, sensibly require voting only by a labor or-
ganization's members in the unit. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-5(K)(1984).
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they may have, while the parties resume bargaining in the original
manner.
Seven days after the publication of the factfinding panel's recommen-
dations, if no agreement has yet been reached, or if the current agreement
has expired before that time, one of three events will take place: 1) in the
case of safety forces, SERB will issue an order directing the parties to
settle their dispute through final-offer arbitration;6" 2) in the case of units
of other employees, the parties may continue to bargain; or 3) the em-
ployee organization may furnish the employer and SERB with ten days
notice of its intent to exercise its right to strike in the event no agreement
is reached within the ten-day period.69 After issuing such a notice and
waiting for the ten-day period to expire, an employee organization which
represents employees other than safety forces may engage in a strike.
If an agreement is reached through negotiation, its monetary aspects
and any other aspects requiring legislative approval must be submitted as
a whole to the appropriate legislative body within fourteen days of either
the date on which agreement between the parties is finalized or the later
date on which the legislature reconvenes. 0 If the legislature votes to dis-
approve the submission, the agreement will not take effect on those eco-
nomic and other issues that are contained in the submission. If the legis-
lature fails to act within thirty days of the package's submission, it is
deemed to have been approved. 71 The legislature thus possesses only a
veto power. The Act also requires no submission of the legislative action
or inaction to the executive branch. This procedure raises constitutional
questions concerning the legislative process and the allocation of author-
ity between the legislative and the executive branches, similar to those
which led the Supreme Court to find the legislative veto unconstitutional
in Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service.2
In the case of safety forces, impasses must be submitted upon the order
*s OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(Page Supp. 1983). The term "safety-related em-
ployees," as used in this Article, includes public employees who are members of police or
fire departments, members of the State Highway Patrol, police, fire, sheriff's department, or
State Highway Patrol dispatchers, dispatchers of emergency medical or rescue personnel
and units, members of exclusive nurses' units, employees of the State School for the Deaf
and of the State School for the Blind, employees of any public employee retirement system,
corrections officers, guards at penal or mental institutions, special policemen or police-
women, psychiatric attendants at mental health forensic facilities, and youth leaders em-
ployed at juvenile correctional facilities-in short, all those public employees listed in
§ 4117.14(D)(1).
69 Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
70 Id. § 4117.10(B).
7 Id.
72 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). In Chadha the United States Supreme Court held that a one-
house legislative veto provision violated both the bicameralism and the presentment clauses
of the Constitution. Id. at 2780-88.
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of SERB to interest arbitration, referred to in the Act as conciliation.13
Under the Act the conciliator must select one or the other party's final
offer on an issue-by-issue basis but may not impose economic changes
affecting the fiscal year in which he or she is appointed. 4 The conciliator
is directed to consider a variety of factors"8 and is empowered to hear
evidence, including any factfinding report.7 6 The legislative body is not
empowered to veto the conciliator's award. 77 That award is reviewable by
the courts only pursuant to Ohio's general arbitration statute,7 8 which
strictly limits the grounds upon which arbitration awards may be vacated
or modified.
E. Protected, Unprotected, and Unlawful Activity
1. Protected Activity
The Act declares that public employees are entitled to "form, join, as-
sist, or participate in . . . any employee organization of their own choos-
ing, ' 7" and are equally entitled to refrain from any such involvement.
Those who do elect to associate have the right to "engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid and protection."80 Additionally, public employees have the right to
present grievances and have them adjusted without the intervention of
the bargaining representative, as long as any adjustment comports with
the collective bargaining agreement, and the bargaining representative is
permitted to be present at the adjustment. 81
Workers are protected in the exercise of these rights largely by the un-
fair labor practice prohibitions contained in the Act. Public employers,
public employee organizations, and other employees are forbidden to co-
erce or obstruct employees in the exercise of enumerated rights, and are
forbidden to cause or seek to cause others to act in derogation of such
rights.8" Apart from these rights, and as previously noted,83 the Act also
grants to nonsafety force employees the right to strike. This right is lim-
ited, however, in several respects. A strike is illegal if it takes place during
the term of a valid collective bargaining agreement, if it occurs before the
7' OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(l)(Page Supp. 1983).
74 Id. § 4117.14(G)(7).
7* See infra text accompanying notes 210 & 211.
" OHIo REV CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(6)(Page Supp. 1983).
77 Id. § 4117.14(1).
79 Id. § 4117.14((H).
7 Id. § 4117.03(A)(1).
80 Id. § 4117.03(A)(2).
8- Id. § 4117.03(A)(5).
82 See id. § 4117.11(A)(1), (B)(1).
83 See supra text accompanying notes 68 & 69.
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expiration of a statutorily prescribed bargaining period, if it is not pre-
ceded by adequate notice, or if it has been enjoined because it constitutes
a clear and present danger to the public health or safety. 4
2. Unprotected Activity
Unprotected activity of employees or the employees' organization falls
into two basic categories: activity that the Act does not affirmatively pro-
tect and activity that the Act "carves out" from the general scope of em-
ployees' rights to engage in concerted activity and makes an unfair labor
practice even if the activity is concerted and involved with terms and con-
ditions of employment. Activity that is simply unprotected but is not in
violation of the Act includes nonconcerted activity of all kinds, concerted
activity not related to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and concerted activity related to terms and conditions of employ-
ment that is deemed to be sufficiently disruptive of employer functions
that it may be prohibited by an employer. Examples of the latter type of
unprotected activity include solicitation of fellow employees while they
are supposed to be working and political campaigning by uniformed po-
lice officers for issues related to terms of employment."
3. Prohibited Activity
Unprotected activity that also constitutes an unfair labor practice gen-
erally falls into one of three categories: 1) actions which interfere with the
exercise of protected rights; 2) actions which improperly involve "neu-
trals"; or 3) the utilization of methods that are deemed improper for ex-
erting pressure on one party or the other. The prohibitions specified in
the Act are as follows: 1) restraint or coercion of other employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by the Act; 2) pressuring an employer
' See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.18(C)(Page Supp. 1983). In addition to injunctive
relief, the Act provides a variety of penalties for illegal strikes. The employees involved are
not entitled to be paid for the period of the strike. Moreover, if unlawful strike activity
persists for more than one day after notice of a SERB decision that the strike is indeed
illegal, the employees involved in the continued activity are subject to permanent removal
or suspension followed by reemployment with limited compensation, if the public employer
so elects. These penalties, if assessed, are appealable to SERB. Additionally, the employer
must deduct from each illegally striking employee's wages two days' pay for each day the
employee was on strike beyond the day's notice of the SERB decision-if SERB determines
that the employer did not cause the strike. Finally, in cases of particularly heinous strike
activity, SERB may grant an employer's petition to make any penalty retroactive to the
date of commencement of the unlawful strike. See id. § 4117.23(A)-(B).
" This type of conduct frequently occurs in the public sector. For example, due to re-
cent police layoffs in the city of Cleveland, Ohio, the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Associa-
tion initiated a petition drive to place a charter amendment on the May 8, 1984 ballot re-
quiring a minimum number of police officers. Police officers solicited petition signatures
during their working hours, despite a provision in the city's charter prohibiting such con-
duct. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 23, 1984, at 4-A.
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to interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against public employees; 3) boy-
cotts in the course of jurisdictional work disputes; 4) striking unlawfully,
or encouraging individuals to strike unlawfully, or refusing to handle cer-
tain goods or perform certain services; 5) pressuring any person in an ef-
fort to force or require any public employee to cease doing business with
any other person, or to force or require a public employer to recognize an
uncertified union as a representative of a group of employees; 6) encour-
aging the picketing of the private residence of a public official or public
employer representative during the course of a labor dispute; 7) failing to
represent fairly all employees in a bargaining unit; and 8) engaging in any
picketing, striking, or other concerted refusal to work without first giving
ten days' written notice to the employer and SERB. 6
F. Synopsis
As is apparent from the above discussion, many of the Act's most im-
portant provisions are substantially similar to those of the most familiar
private sector model-the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The
legislature has chosen, through the Act, to accord employees and labor
organizations most of the same rights, including in many cases the right
to strike, that are given to private sector employees and unions. Most of
the obligations that are imposed upon private sector employers by the
NLRA are imposed upon public employers by the Act.
III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
The propriety of authorizing employees of a public entity to join to-
gether and bargain collectively has been the subject of a great deal of
thoughtful commentary, most focused upon asserted similarities and dif-
ferences between private and public sector labor relations."7 While it is
s OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(B)(Page Supp. 1983). This provision applies not only
to unions but also to public employees; its private sector counterpart, § 8(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1982), is applicable only to unions and their agents.
However, § 4117.11(C) of the Act provides that a public employee may not be disciplined
on the basis that an unfair labor practice has been committed by the employee. See infra
text accompanying notes 148-50.
87 See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971); Anderson,
Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969); Ed-
wards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885 (1973);
Imundo, Some Comparisons Between Public Sector and Private Sector Collective Bargain-
ing, 24 LAB. L.J. 810 (1973); Petro, Public-Sector Bargaining: An Assessment, 3 GOV'T
UNION REV. 3 (Winter 1982); Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences Between Public and
Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L. REV. 867 (1972); Summers, Public Em-
ployee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Wellington & Winter,
Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805 (1970)[hereinaf-
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not the purpose of this Article to take a position on whether public em-
ployee bargaining is good or bad, it is the goal of this Article to assess the
Ohio Act. That assessment will be based upon how well the Act is struc-
tured to achieve the benefits claimed by the advocates of public employee
bargaining and to avoid the problems cited by critics. The asserted bene-
fits and problems fall into three broad categories: rights of employees;
rights and duties of labor organizations; and effects upon democratic po-
litical processes. Accordingly, the analysis of the Ohio Act will be accom-
plished by scrutinizing its impact in these three areas. In order to focus
the subsequent discussion, the arguments that have been made concern-
ing the subject of public employee bargaining will first be set forth
summarily.
B. Considerations Favoring Public Employee Bargaining
1. The central argument in favor of public employee bargaining is that
public employees should not be denied rights that are enjoyed by employ-
ees in the private sector."8 Proponents argue that without a collective
voice of their own, public employees will always be short-changed. The
eventual result will be less qualified, less motivated, and less active em-
ployees, who will then be seen as less deserving of future wage increases.
2. Another major argument in support of public sector collective bar-
gaining is that the institution of collective bargaining is a good one and
that the public sector can derive benefits from it. In relation to private
sector bargaining, Congress has found:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards com-
merce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the
flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of in-
dustrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental
to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
ter cited as Structuring Collective Bargaining]; Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collec-
tive Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969)[hereinafter cited as
Limits].
88 Robert Brindza, president of the American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees, Ohio Council 8, and International Vice President of the American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees, stated that: "Senate Bill 133 will bring
Ohio's public employees out of the dark ages. It will finally give them some rights that begin
to equal the same rights of workers in the private sector, the federal sector, and other public
sectors across this nation." Hearings on S.B. 133 Before the Commerce and Labor Sub-
comm. of the Ohio Senate Mar. 28, 1983, at 4 (statement of Robert Brindza). See also Hear-
ings on S.B. 133 Before the Commerce and Labor Subcomm. of the Ohio Senate, Apr. 19,
1983 (statement of James Monroe, Executive Director of the Ohio Civil Service Employees
Association); Hearings on S.B. 133 Before the Commerce and Labor Subcomm. of the Ohio
Senate, Mar. 28, 1983 (statement of Douglas J. Holmes, Director of Governmental Affairs
for the Communication Workers of America, Council of Public Workers).
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differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and
by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees.""
Since after fifty years of federally-mandated collective bargaining in the
private sector, Congress has not felt strongly enough that the system of
collective bargaining has not worked to change it in any substantial way,
it may be concluded that private sector collective bargaining does provide
these benefits to society and should be protected. Extending collective
bargaining to the public sector would appear to be a means of extending
such benefits to that sector."
Perhaps chief among those alleged benefits would be more orderly la-
bor relations. The result of unionization is generally a regularization of
employee relations and a channelling of frustration and illwill into a rela-
tively safe outlet. 1 Poor relationships between unions and employers may
result in difficult bargaining sessions and possibly strikes, but will not
generally erupt into violence and revolution. Strikes tend to occur, if at
all, at predictable times and under generally expected and accepted con-
ditions (e.g., limitations upon the numbers and activities of pickets). In
the long run, providing the outlet of organized unionization has preserved
a private capitalistic economy rather than threatened it. Public sector
unionization will accomplish the same ends. As collective bargaining rela-
89 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
90 In connection with the enactment of the Federal Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966)(current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982)), the following find-
ings were made:
§ 7101. Findings and purpose
(a) The Congress finds that -
(1) experience in both private and public employment indicates that the statu-
tory protection of the right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and par-
ticipate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which af-
fect them-
(A) safeguards the public interest,
(B) contributes to the effective conduct of public business, and
(C) facilitates and encourages the amicable settlements of disputes between em-
ployees and their employers involving conditions of employment; and
(2) the public interest demands the highest standards of employee performance
and the continued development and implementation of modern and progressive
work practices to facilitate and improve employee performance and the efficient
accomplishment of the operations of the Government.
Therefore, labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in
the public interest.
5 US.C. § 7101 (1982).
" According to the Supreme Court: "[A] fundamental aim of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of inter-
state commerce. . . . Central to achievement of this purpose is the promotion of collective
bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between labor and manage-
ment." First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 667 (1980).
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tionships become more regularized and of longer duration, strikes will be-
come less frequent.
With or without legislation, public employee unionization is a fact of
life.9' Without legislation, the dealings between employers and employee
organizations will often be unstructured, chaotic, and disruptive. Employ-
ees not only may be saddled with a union they do not want but they may
have no effective way of switching to another.93 Legislation would protect
these employee concerns and would regularize the process of determining
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of unionized pub-
lic sector employees.
3. An evident goal is also to advance unions. Unions are vital institu-
tions in our society at large. Moreover, because they provide a unique
means for workers to exert political pressure to counter the political clout
of "big business," unions should be preserved and strengthened. Private
sector employers, however, have developed such sophisticated anti-union
techniques that private sector employees are no longer increasing their
support to unions. Permitting public sector employees to bargain collec-
tively will open the field of public employment for unions, and will un-
doubtedly improve their membership and financial strength.
4. A general argument in favor of unionization is that unions provide a
good training ground for democracy. 94 Since most unions feature a consti-
tution, elections, and, more or less, due process in their proceedings,
union members can gain "hands on" experience with a democratic insti-
tution. Public employees can benefit from this experience.
5. Finally, the argument is made that collective bargaining can result in
better decisionmaking by public authorities.9 5 The process of collective
bargaining provides an especially good method for imparting expertise to
public employers. In the private sector, most managers and boards are
assumed to be knowledgeable about their businesses. In the public sector,
this assumption may often be invalid. For instance, a school board may
have no expertise in education and, in the absence of a collective bargain-
ing agent, would rely almost exclusively upon the recommendations of the
school superintendent. A teachers' union, presenting an alternate "ex-
pert" view, would enable the lay board members to make a more in-
formed decision.
C. Considerations Opposing Public Employee Bargaining
1. The major argument against public employee collective bargaining is
that collective bargaining in the public sector inherently conflicts with
" Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931, 931-32 (1969).
" Ass'n of Cuyahoga County Teachers v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Mental Retardation,
6 Ohio St. 3d 190, 451 N.E.2d 1215 (1983).
9' A. Cox & D. BoK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 140-41 (5th ed. 1962).
" See supra note 90.
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political democracy." In a democracy, the kind and scale of governmental
activities are to be determined by democratic processes-elections and
acts of legislative and executive authorities. Various interest groups and
individuals are free, and indeed are encouraged, to attempt to exert influ-
ence on political decisions. This sharply contrasts with the private sector
where wages are set by economic forces. It is one thing to decide that
market forces produce an unsatisfactory result and to attempt to restruc-
ture the relative strength of economic actors,97 and quite another to de-
cide that political forces produce an unsatisfactory result and to attempt
to change the democratic process itself by giving preferred economic and
political status to one of many interest groups. To require the public en-
tity to deal with one particular interest group in a closed, or at least fun-
damentally different, forum subverts the normal process. Collective bar-
gaining inherently grants disproportionate power to the interest group
that has access to the collective bargaining forum at the expense of other
groups. To the extent that public employees are permitted to engage in
strikes to support their demands, the democratic process is even further
distorted; to the extent that authority is given in the course of this pro-
cess to private mediators, conciliators or arbitrators, democracy is simply
not present. Since the procedure of going through democratic political
steps to reach a decision has value apart from the decision itself, collec-
tive bargaining, being antidemocratic, should not be sanctioned in the
public sector.
2. Public employment is different in kind from private employment.
The services performed by public employees (e.g., policemen, firemen,
waste collectors, prison guards) are unique and irreplaceable. Market con-
straints that operate to limit the conduct of private employers and pri-
vate employee unions do not apply, or apply only partially, to the public
sector." Indeed, it is the very ineffectiveness of the market and price
mechanisms in allocating such necessary goods and services as police and
fire protection that causes the need for the services to be provided by
government in the first place. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that
public sector collective bargaining will result in the societal benefits that
have attended private sector bargaining.
Moreover, from the employees' standpoint, the public sector has civil
service and constitutional protections against employer actions that the
private sector lacks.9 9 Therefore, public employees do not have the same
need to band together for protection.
3. An argument which is closely related to the two preceding ones is
" Structuring Collective Bargaining, supra note 87, at 809,819.
"7 Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 999-1005 (1984).
98 Structuring Collective Bargaining, supra note 87, at 807.
99 See infra note 111; see also OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 124.01-.99 (Page 1984)(contain-
ing statutory protections for public employees).
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that the sanctions which are regarded as legitimate and fundamental sup-
ports for collective bargaining in the private sector-particularly the
strike and the lockout-have very different purposes and effects in the
public sector.100 Ordinarily, a private sector strike is designed to put eco-
nomic pressure on the employer by keeping the employer from providing
to customers the goods or services produced by the striking employees.
Such strikes are intended to restrict completely, or at least curtail
sharply, the employer's ability to earn money. The employer's customers
will find alternate sources of supply and thereby effectively put pressure
on the employer to settle. A private sector union hopes that such factors
will lead the employer to decide that the costs of enduring the strike are
greater than those of acceding to the union's demands.
At the same time their employer is weighing the costs and benefits of a
strike, private sector employees are doing much the same thing. They and
their union must consider analogous factors, including: the cost of the
strike compared with the gains that might flow from a successful strike;
the possibility that they will be replaced permanently; and the potential
that the employer will go out of business, move, or scale down the work
force. Further, customer pressure may not be supportive of the union's
position, as where such pressure takes the form of resistance to higher
prices.
In the public sector, a strike is usually not intended to impose an eco-
nomic sanction upon the employer. The employees certainly stop provid-
ing services, but that action puts little, if any, financial pressure on the
public employer. Taxes must be paid whether or not the police or teach-
ers are striking. Indeed, the strike can result in the public employer's
having more financial ability to pay higher wage-precisely because the
employer has fixed revenues and does not have to pay employees any
wages while they are striking.
The public strike sector does, however, have as its purpose the bringing
to bear of political pressure on the public employer, by harming those
who depend upon the services provided by the striking employees. In a
private sector strike, where there is almost always present either an alter-
nate source of supply, an opportunity to stockpile, a high degree of auto-
mation, or a combination of these factors, customers are usually able to
avoid the effects of a strike. In contrast, the consumers of public sector
services are particularly vulnerable. They are usually in no position to
secure an alternative supply of the services being withheld or, without
great delay, difficulty, and expense, to relocate to another jurisdiction.
Moreover, while private sector consumers provide the revenue for the pri-
vate employer, the primary recipients of public services may not be the
same as the primary financial supporters of those services. Welfare pro-
OO Meltzer & Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air
Traffic Controllers, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 731, 733-46 (1983).
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vides a good example.
From the point of view of both the public employer and the public sec-
tor union, a strike is won or lost on the basis of politics, not economics. A
private employer would probably be inclined to believe it could win a
strike if it maximized the economic harm to the strikers while it mini-
mized the disruption of its own operations. A public employer might per-
versely see that the political sentiment adverse to the union's position
might best be mobilized if the strikers suffered very little while essential
public services were disrupted to the maximum extent. The public is thus
the focus of every public sector strike, not as a participant in the process,
but as a pawn. The public sector strike is by nature designed to hurt
innocent people who have no means of protecting themselves;' 0 ' it is an
unfair, disproportionately powerful and antidemocratic political weapon.
4. An additional argument focuses upon the effect of bargaining on the
number of such strikes.10' As a practical matter, there are few, if any,
strikes by unorganized employees. Unionization itself results in more
pressures for strikes, and collective bargaining provides an adversarial
framework that further encourages impasses and strikes. Public employee
bargaining thus increases the number of strikes. Unlike the situation that
existed in the private sector prior to the passage of the Wagner Act, there
is no widespread public sector labor unrest that needs to be channeled
into socially acceptable forms. There is thus no great societal benefit,
such as preservation of a free enterprise economy, to be obtained from
enduring strikes.
5. A further argument is that the process of bargaining acutally changes
the quality, quantity, and cost of services. 10' Group demands, particularly
when formulated as part of an initially unreasonable bargaining position,
tend to be more extreme than individual demands. Some demands such
as dues checkoffs would never be made or considered without unioniza-
tion. Further, the collective bargaining process often involves trading off
or swapping demands. These trades often will be made on the basis of the
trading value of the demands, not on their intrinsic merit.
Administrative flexibility is almost invariably eroded in the collective
bargaining process, and therefore whatever efficiency the public employer
has achieved will be diminished. Also often reduced is the ability to pro-
vide new or improved services, such as more police patrols in public hous-
101 The drafters of the Act showed sensitivity to this point in at least one interesting
situation. They denied the right to strike to employees of any public employee retirement
system, lumping them in the same category as safety forces. OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.14(D)(1)(Page Supp. 1983). A strike by such employees would not inconvenience the
general public at all, but would create great difficulty for retired public employees (includ-
ing those elected public office holders who are receiving pensions for past service as public
employees).
102 Anderson, supra note 87, at 944; Kheel, supra note 92, at 931-32.
1o K. AULETTA, THE STREETS WERE PAVED WITH GOLD 45-51 (1979).
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ing projects in response to tenant organization requests.
While private sector managers must take into account the long term
effects of concessions to union demands (if they do not, the market surely
will, in one form or another, e.g., lower stock prices), public sector execu-
tives operate under no such constraint. The goal of private sector manag-
ers is thought to be maximizing factors such as profitability, growth, and
stability so as to maximize stock values and their own job security and
income. The goal of political office holders is thought to be reelection or
election to higher office. Thus, their tendency may be to balance this
year's books at the cost of the future financial health of the public
entity.'04
The remainder of this Article will consider how the Act is structured to
handle the foregoing notions-notions which underlie the three basic ar-
eas alluded to earlier. Has the Act given Ohio's public employees appro-
priate and necessary rights? Has it provided unions with effective and
appropriate organizational and bargaining tools? Has it minimized the
potential antidemocratic effects of collective bargaining?
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
A. Employees' Rights
A manifest goal of the Act is to provide public employees with the
"rights" enjoyed by their private sector counterparts."' 0 The language of
the Act and of its sponsors indicates clearly that the model for the public
employee rights established in the Act was the NLRA.o s
Before considering how closely the Ohio Act tracks the grant of rights
to private employees by the NLRA, it is appropriate to consider what
those "NLRA rights" are and why they are needed in legislation. In re-
viewing these rights, it is assumed that they are coupled with a remedy.
0 7
For example, in the private sector the right really is not "to join a union";
rather it is "to join a union without getting fired." In these terms, the
relevant employee rights in the private sector are as follows:
1. The right to form, join or assist labor organizations or to engage in
'o, Summers, supra note 87.
105 See supra note 88.
"'s See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). All further citations and references to the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) will be to sections of the Act as currently codified in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C. (1982).
0' Protection of the affirmatively stated employees' rights is substantially identical
under the NLRA and the Ohio Act. Since no right is assured without some remedy for its
infringement, each act sets out a number of "unfair labor practices" that may be committed
by employers or labor organizations and empowers its respective board to furnish remedies.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1982); OHIo REv. CODE ANN- §§ 4117.11-.12 (Page Supp. 1983).
For a discussion of the remedies provided by the Act, see infra note 148.
[Vol. 33:593
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss4/4
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
concerted activity for mutual aid or protection without being discrimi-
nated against, or interfered with by either the employer or a labor organi-
zation.108 2. The right to refrain from forming, joining, or assisting labor
organizations, or to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protec-
tion, again without discrimination or interference, except to the extent
authorized by a lawful union security agreement. 09
These rights basically encompass the first amendment rights of free ex-
pression and freedom of association. Absent their inclusion in the statute,
these rights would not otherwise be assertible by private employees
against their employers or unions, because private entities are not gener-
ally constrained by the first amendment. 1 0 However, public employers
are generally so governed through the incorporation of the first amend-
ment protections by the fourteenth amendment."' At first glance, there-
fore, it appears that no statutory recognition of workers' rights is neces-
sary for public employees. However, the true worth of general
108 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
See id.
Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)(employer owning company town
may impose no greater time, place, and manner restrictions upon speech than may a city or
state government with respect to publicly owned or dedicated areas) with Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)(shopping center owner may ban picketing upon entire commer-
cial property).
Unless private sector workers work in a highly isolated setting, their employers' plants are
generally treated under the NLRA more like shopping centers than like company towns-at
least with respect to outsiders. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956)(since other channels of communication were available, employer could exclude
nonworker union organizers from plant and parking lots without violating NLRA protection
of workers' right to self-organize).
.' With respect to the right of association, see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960)(state statute requiring state-supported teachers and professors to file affidavit listing
all memberships held unconstitutional). Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)(state
may not obtain membership list of civil rights group). With respect to the freedom of
speech, see Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)(operative test of public regulation
of expression in public places is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time).
The first amendment rights of public employees are not unfettered by virtue of these
decisions; these rights are, in fact, qualified freedoms rather than unqualified powers. See,
e.g., Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984). In
Knight, the Supreme Court held that a publicly employed professor's rights of speech and
association did not entitle him-either as a member of the general public, as a college in-
structor, or as a state employee-to be heard by the state's boards governing community
colleges, notwithstanding a state-created statutory right for exclusive bargaining representa-
tives of such employees to meet and confer with their employers. According to the Court, an
individual's exclusion from "meet and confer" sessions does not deny him equal protection
of the laws as his interests are served by the faculty's exclusive representative. Id. at 1069-
70.
For further discussion of exclusive representation, see infra notes 175-81 and accompany-
ing text. Cf. Galer v. Board of Regents, 239 Ga. 268, 236 S.E.2d 617 (1977)(public employees
subject to greater restrictions on first amendment rights than private citizens).
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constitutional rights cannot be assessed without considering how those
rights are implemented in practice.
In this regard, it is important to note several specific ways in which the
basic employee rights are implemented in the private sector:
1. Within certain limits, supporters of particular views may communi-
cate, and those wishing to learn may receive communications, in the em-
ployer's plant or on private property.'2. Individual redress of grievances
may be accomplished, if not inconsistent with the labor contract and if
the union is represented. " 3 3. Employees must be fairly represented by a
labor organization."' 4. Employees may vote in elections of three types:
certification, 15 decertification"' and deauthorization." 7 5. Employees
may engage in collective bargaining and require their employers to do
so."' 6. Employees may withhold their labor (strike), but they may also,
except in certain circumstances, claim a job after the strike is over.1' 9
Because there is no constitutional restraint on public employers or,
where applicable, on labor organizations concerning these areas of imple-
mentation-communications, grievances, fair representation, voting, bar-
gaining, and work stoppage-statutory treatment is required. As will be
seen in the remainder of this section, the Act does provide Ohio public
employees with most of the rights given to private employees by the
NLRA. However, the Act goes beyond the NLRA in some respects, and in
others does not give employees all of the NLRA rights.
The Act adopts the NLRA's basic scheme of enumerated worker rights
with a few adjustments. Section 4117.03(A) of the Act provides that pub-
lic employees have the right to:
1. Form, join, assist, or participate in, or refrain from forming,
joining, assisting, or participating in, except as otherwise provided
,' As indicated in the text, this is a limited right. Union membership solicitation by fel-
low employees may be banned by the employer during working time. See Our Way, Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. No. 61, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,3 (1983). However, a private employer
may not ban or punish such activity in the workplace during nonworking time, unless there
is some extraordinary justification. Compare Republican Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945)(employer must tolerate some inconvenience caused by union organizing activity
to safeguard employees' NLRA § 7 rights) with Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d
375 (7th Cir. 1952)(retail store employer may more stringently limit an employee's prounion
solicitation in retail store environment because high degree of contact with general public).
The "right" to distribute prounion literature in the private sector workplace is even more
restricted. See, e.g., Erie Marine, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 793 (1971), enforced 465 F.2d 104 (3d
Cir. 1972).
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1982).
' This entitlement has gradually been implied under the NLRA. See infra text accom-
panying note 147.
"' 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(i)(1982).
Id. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii).
.. Id. § 158(a)(3).
' See id. § 157.
"' See id.
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in Chapter 4117 of the Revised Code, any employee organization
of their own choosing;
2. Engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid and protection;
3. Representation by an employee organization;
4. Bargain collectively with their public employers to determine
wages, hours, terms and other conditions of employment and the
continuation, modification, or deletion of an existing provision of
a collective bargaining agreement, and enter into collective bar-
gaining agreements;
5. Present grievances and have them adjusted, without the in-
tervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement then in effect and as long as the bargaining
representatives have the opportunity to be present at the
adjustment.120
Section 4117.03 is clearly derived from the enumeration of employee
rights in section 7 of the NLRA; there are only minor differences between
the sections and they appear to involve no divergence from the underly-
ing NLRA policy or practice. In one case, that of the employees' right to
grieve, the Act simply imports a stray provision of the NLRA 12 into the
employees' rights section where it thematically belongs.
The rights accorded employees under section 7 of the NLRA and under
section 4117.03 of the Act are protected in the first instance by general
clauses in both acts which declare that conduct by either employers or
labor organizations that obstructs or coerces employees in the exercise of
their enumerated rights constitutes an unfair labor practice., 22 After es-
tablishing these blanket prohibitions, the respective unfair labor practice
provisions list specific disfavored employer and union tactics as addi-
tional unfair labor practices.12 3 Some of these specific prohibitions are
designed, at least in part, to vindicate individual employee rights, while
others serve such purposes as protecting the machinery of the Act itself,
minimizing labor unrest, or fostering collective bargaining in a noncoer-
cive atmosphere, thereby protecting interstate commerce (the NLRA) or
the delivery of public services (the Act). Of course, it is difficult to iden-
tify precisely where employees' rights as individuals end and their collec-
... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03(A)(Page Supp. 1983).
29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1982).
See id. § 158(a)(1)(1982) (regulating employers); id. § 158(b)(1)(A) (regulating labor
organizations and their members); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(1) (Page Supp.
1983)(regulating employers and their agents or representatives); id. § 4117.11(B)(1)-(2)(reg-
ulating public employee organizations, their agents or representatives, and public
employees).
"I See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)-(5)(1982); id. § 158(b)(2)-(4); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.11(A)(2)-(8); id. § 4117.11(B)(3)-(8).
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tive rights begin, given both acts' promotion of collective bargaining as a
means of vindicating individual entitlements through a pooling of efforts.
Accordingly, there will be some overlap between this section and that
dealing with unions as institutions.
1. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
As noted above, both acts protect the worker's right to engage in self-
organization activities and to participate in the operation of the resulting
union, if any. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or ad-
ministration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it." 2 4  Expanding on this NLRA language, section
4117.11(A)(2) of the Act adds the verbs "initiate" and "create" to the
prohibition. This additional language supplies nothing, however, that has
not already been read into the NLRA clause by NLRB and Supreme
Court interpretations. 12 5 Both clauses prohibit an employer from using
his financial resources or occupational control over the workers to create
a sham, "company" union, as well as from buying off a union once it has
won employee support.12 Moreover, these clauses severely restrict the
employer in acting on any temptation to favor one union over another in
a representation campaign.
Although the danger of employer domination might appear somewhat
less threatening in the public sector than in the private sector, the Act
contains an antidomination provision which, along with related provi-
sions, seeks to assure employee autonomy at both the representation elec-
tion 17 and bargaining128 stages. Such autonomy certainly is desirable
from the standpoint of public employees and, in the final analysis, proba-
bly limits the potential for collusion between management and labor that
124 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(1982).
"I See e.g., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938)(sustaining
NLRB finding of employer unfair labor practice for promoting organization of "company
union").
"I Section 4117.11(A)(2) provides that a public employer may pay employees for time
spent conferring with a union during working hours. Additionally, a public employer may
allow the exclusive representative to use its facilities for membership or other meetings or
use the internal mail system or other internal communication system. The denial of similar
access to rival unions has been found not to violate the first and fourteenth amendments.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
117 Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2)(Page Supp. 1983). Under this section, SERB
may certify a union as the exclusive representative if it finds that the employer's unfair
labor practices have made a "free and untrammelled" election impossible, provided that the
union, at one time, had the support of a majority of the employees. Id.
Ill Id. § 4117.20. This section disqualifies employee organization members from partici-
pating in the collective bargaining process on the employer's behalf and directs the em-
ployer to remove any such person from the bargaining team (or any other role in the
process).
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would disrupt the democratic process even more than would collective
bargaining alone.
Both acts also protect the right to self-organization by forbidding em-
ployers from using their otherwise lawful powers to control hiring, fir-
ing,and discipline in order to influence workers' choices as to membership
in a labor organization. In section 4117.11(A)(3), the Act expands upon
the language of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by making it unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate in regard to any term or condition of employ-
ment on the basis of the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed by the
Act."1 29 However, under the NLRA, section 8(a)(1) covers any discrimina-
tion based upon the exercise of protected rights that Section 8(a)(3)
might otherwise not encompass, so that the Act's coverage is essentially
the same as that of the NLRA."30
Under the NLRA, this antidiscrimination clause has been most fre-
quently invoked to remedy discipline given for union-related activity. 3'
This will also be the likely result under the Act.22
In protecting the right of employees to associate in labor organizations,
section 4117.11(A)(3) supplements protections already furnished to public
employees as citizens by virtue of the state'33 and federal' 3' constitutions.
While the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association protects an
employee against employer discipline for supporting a labor organization,
the means for vindicating such rights-a lawsuit, such as one in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985-is in practice suitable only for
substantial injuries. There is also no constitutional right at all to engage
in certain activity such as striking. Section 4117.11(A)(3) addresses this
issue by permitting public employees to exercise any rights afforded by
the Act without interference from public employers. In addition, the Act's
12 Id. § 4117.11(A)(3). The narrower NLRA prohibition forbids such employer discrimi-
nation "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3)(1982).
Note that both acts carve out an exception to their respective antidiscrimination clauses
for "union security" arrangements. The NLRA clause provides that an employer may agree
to a union shop clause, requiring union membership as a condition of employment, subject
to certain restrictions. Id. The Ohio Act's antidiscrimination clause permits an employer to
agree to an agency shop clause which requires nonunion employees to pay a periodic "fair
share fee" to the union in lieu of membership dues. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4417.09 (Page
Supp. 1983); id. § 4117.11(A)(3). For discussion of the significance of the Act's treatment of
union security, see infra text accompanying notes 151-62.
130 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1982).
131 See, e.g., Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
13, See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983); see also
SERB v. Akron Bd. of Educ., 2 OHIO PuD. EMPLOYEE REP. 2606 (SERB May 28, 1985).
133 See OHIO CONST. art. I, § 3. Section 3 provides that "[t]he people have the right to
assemble together, in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; to instruct
their Representatives; and to petition the General Assembly for the redress of grievances."
's' See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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procedures for remedying unfair labor practices offer public employees an
expedited and costfree method of obtaining relief from employers whose
discriminatory actions would otherwise chill the exercise of guaranteed
rights.' 35
Both acts also secure employee rights by expressly forbidding the dis-
charge of or any discrimination against any employee for having filed
charges provided for by the acts or having testified in the proceedings. 3
Even before the enactment of the Act's pertinent provision, section
4117.11(A)(4), public employers were arguably precluded from disciplin-
ing employees for testifying at public proceedings." 7  Section
4117.11(A)(4) will solidify this protection; moreover, in all likelihood it
will expand it because it will probably be interpreted as precluding em-
ployers from discriminating against employees who merely cooperate with
SERB personnel. Such protection has been held to exist under the corre-
sponding NLRA section and has been frequently invoked with respect to
NLRB investigations. 38
Although the Act closely tracks section 8(a) of the NLRA in the prohi-
bition of employer conduct in derogation of workers' rights, it also takes
some further steps. Under the Act it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "[e]stablish a pattern or practice of repeated failures to
timely process grievances and requests for arbitration of grievances.""'
Whether this specific language, which is not contained in the NLRA, will
add anything to employee rights is not apparent.
The Act goes another step further than the NLRA in protecting work-
ers' rights by expressly declaring that an employer's causing or attempt-
ing to cause an employee organization to commit an unfair labor practice
is an unfair labor practice. 40 A number of the prohibitions imposed upon
1 Presumably, SERB will remedy employer unfair labor practices more quickly than the
federal courts respond to actions brought, for instance, under the civil rights acts. Moreover,
SERB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims will save public employees and their
counsel the procedural difficulties of confronting the ripeness, standing, mootness, and jus-
ticiability hurdles traditionally associated with constitutional adjudication.
'3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)(1982); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(4)(Page Supp. 1983).
"' In Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), the Supreme Court of the United
States stated that first amendment freedoms, such as the right of association, "are protected
not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle
governmental interference." Id. at 523. Accord Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574
P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978). Under this line of reasoning, a state employer's dis-
charge of an employee for testifying at public proceedings regarding his employment would
be as constitutionally impermissible as a discharge for affiliation with an employees'
organization.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972)(sworn statement to Board investiga-
tor); Sinclair Glass Co. v. NLRB, 465 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1972)(employee filing affidavit with
Board).
119 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(6)(Page Supp. 1983).
140 Id. § 4117.11(A)(8).
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labor organizations are designed to protect employee rights. "'" This provi-
sion enhances employees' protection from indirect interference by em-
ployers and appears to serve an appropriate purpose.
2. Union Unfair Labor Practices
The Act also defines certain actions of labor organizations, their agents,
or representatives, or of public employees as unfair labor practices.' In
most cases, the Act tracks the NLRA fairly closely. However, certain pro-
visions of the Act differ enough to merit brief comment.
The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of section 8(a)(3) or to discriminate against an em-
ployee with respect to whom membership in the labor organization has
been denied or terminated on some grounds other than a failure to tender
the initiation fees and dues uniformly required. 2" Because the language
of section 8(a)(3) is limited, decisional law has been necessary to make it
clear that a union may also not cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee because of the employee's filing of grievances of which the
union disapproves, or for testifying adversely to the union in unfair labor
practice proceedings. 4 4 The Ohio Act makes it clear that a labor organi-
zation violates the law if it tries to cause the employer to commit any
unfair labor practice.145 In view of the gaps in the NLRA provision, the
Act's drafters in this instance correctly expanded the statutory language
setting forth the protection afforded to public employees.
Unlike the NLRA, the Act expressly makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employee organization to "[flail to fairly represent all public em-
ployees in a bargaining unit."'"6 A duty of fair representation was not
contained in the NLRA's language and was not recognized by the NLRB
until nearly a decade after the law was first passed. 4" Although the Act
leaves open the question of just how zealous union representation of an
employee must be in order to be "fair," it at least assures that SERB's
" Among the union unfair labor practices proscribed by 4117.11(B) of the Act are: 1)
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their § 4117.03(A) rights, id.
§ 4117.11(B)(1); and 2) failing to represent fairly all of the public employees in the bargain-
ing unit, id. § 4117.11(B)(6).
I" Id. § 4117.11(B).
,,3 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)(1982).
.. See, e.g., Partin v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829
(1966).
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(B)(2)(Page Supp. 1983).
146 Id. § 4117.11(B)(6).
117 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944); see also Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). See generally Cox, The Duty o/ Fair Representation, 2
VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal
Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958).
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energies will not be spent on a threshold question as to whether unfair
representation is prohibited conduct.
3. Employee Protection from Disciplinary Action
Perhaps the most unusual protection afforded individual employees by
the Act is embodied in a section which provides that a public employer
may not discipline a public employee for committing an unfair labor prac-
tice.'"" However, it is assumed that this provision would not preclude dis-
cipline of an employee for committing an act that is both an unfair labor
practice and a violation of a valid rule, statute, or commonly accepted
standard of conduct. For example, if a public employee assaulted a fellow
employee for failing to join a union, presumably the imposition of disci-
pline would not violate the Act. This provision of the Act has no analogue
in private sector labor law, and its existence may encourage unlawful ac-
tion by public employees unless and until its parameters have been ap-
propriately limited by SERB and the courts. In addition, employees who
have committed unfair labor practices are rendered immune by the Act
from suits for damages based upon such unlawful conduct. 49 Individual
striking firemen, for example, would be free from responsibility to pay
anyone for damages caused by their illegal strike. Similar protection for
private employees has been developed pursuant to court decisions. s0
4. Right to Refrain from Undesired Associations
One difference between the Act and the NLRA with respect to em-
ployee rights lies in the extent to which they protect workers from unde-
sired associations. Both of the acts accord to their respective workers the
right to refrain from associating-except as otherwise provided 151-but
the "provisions otherwise" differ. The NLRA expressly permits a bargain-
ing unit to negotiate its way to "union shop" status. 5 2 A private employer
may thus agree to require, as a condition of employment within the bar-
gaining unit, that each employee join the union within the later of thirty
days from the effective date of the agreement, or thirty days from the
beginning of his or her employment. 3
... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(C)(Page Supp. 1983). As is the case under the NLRA,
remedies available under the Act for unfair labor practices include cease-and-desist orders,
reinstatement and/or back pay awards to wrongfully discharged employees, and such other
relief as is appropriate to fulfill the purposes of the Act. Like the NLRB, SERB is empow-
ered to seek injunctive relief in the courts in cases in which the usual remedies would not by
themselves suffice. See id. §§ 4117.12, .15, .16.
" Id. § 4117.11(C).
See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
' 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03(A)(1)(Page Supp. 1983).
,2 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(1982 ).
' ' The NLRA does require, however, that for an employer to be able lawfully to so agree,
the labor organization must be the lawful representative of the employees. The NLRA fur-
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The Act, on the other hand, expressly forbids the inclusion of "union
shop" provisions in collective bargaining agreements.'54 The Act does,
however, permit "agency shops" to be created through the collective bar-
gaining process.26 In an "agency shop," unit members are not required to
join the union or to pay union dues, but the organization's representation
of nonmembers in the unit is recognized and required, through the agree-
ment, to be paid for. Agency shop provisions are designed to deal with the
"free rider" argument: in the absence of such provisions, unit workers
could withhold financial support from the labor organization, thus placing
an unfair burden on the employees who do belong to the union which has
expended the energies and resources necessary to obtain "benefits" for all
and which has a statutory duty to represent everyone in the unit, member
or not. The Act permits agency shops by authorizing the inclusion of a
contractual provision requiring, as a condition of employment, that
within a certain period after the effective date of either the agreement or
the individual's employment, each unit employee who is not a union
member may be required to begin paying a "fair share fee" which is sup-
posed to be the pro rata actual cost incurred by the union in representing
the unit.'
The "fair share fee" is regulated in a number of ways. Unlike union
dues, which may be payroll-deducted only upon the employer's receipt of
the individual worker's authorization,' 57 fair share fees may be deducted
automatically on the basis of the agreement alone;158 however, a limited
exception allows a worker with religious convictions against financial sup-
port to unions to divert the fee to a nonreligious charitable organiza-
tion. '5 Additionally, there is a dual ceiling on the fair share fee that may
be assessed. One ceiling forbids the assessment of a fair share fee higher
than actual union dues.5 0 What may be a lower ceiling is the amount it
actually costs the union to perform its representation functions, as distin-
guished from political or other activities not germane to representation.'1
ther provides that the employer's agreement is void if, within the year preceding it, a major-
ity of the employees had voted to rescind the union's authority to make such an agreement.
Id.
164 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C)(Page Supp. 1983).
15 Id.
1-6 Id.
157 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(B)(2)(Page Supp. 1983) requires that a provision obli-
gating the employer to check off union dues be included in every collective bargaining agree-
ment under the Act.
15' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C)(Page Supp. 1983) provides that if a fairshare pro-
vision is negotiated, the fee is to be deducted automatically without obtaining individual
authorizations from the affected workers.
159 Id. See also In re John H. Miller, No. 84-CE-09-1923 (SERB June 10, 1985).
"e Id.
Id. For an example, see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), in which
the Supreme Court held that nonunion public employees may stop their bargaining unit's
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Since unions will make the determination of how much of their dues in-
come is expended on activities that are germane, and since that determi-
nation is final absent a SERB finding that it was arbitrary and capri-
cious, 62 it is to be expected that there will be little difference between
dues of members and the fair share fee of nonmembers.
In sum, the Ohio Act provides public employees with greater freedom
from mandatory association than the NLRA does for private employees,
inasmuch as private employees may be required through a contract to
join a union and public employees may not, although the financial burden
on nonsupporters of the union in organized bargaining units may not be
much different.
5. Right to Participate in Elections
Probably the most fundamental rights that can be accorded to public
employees in the context of labor relations are the rights to choose
whether to secure union representation and to decide whether to retain
such representation. What the Act grants to individual workers by way of
a right to choose in its "enumerated rights" and "unfair labor practice"
sections, it may-absent thoughtful interpretation by SERB and the
courts-all but take away.
The Act does not contain any clause which is equivalent of section 8(c)
of the NLRA. Since its amendment in 1947 by the Labor Management
Relations Act,"6 3 the NLRA has included in that section the following
qualification upon its unfair labor practice provisions:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 4
The absence of such a clause in the Act raises a question about the scope
of free expression, the resolution of which will significantly affect Ohio
public workers' freedom of choice respecting representation election
campaigns.
Perhaps the Act's noninclusion of a provision similar to section 8(c)
reflects a legislative intention to permit a "pure" constitutional standard
in the realm of public employment, thus allowing an employer to promise,
for instance, that innumerable benefits will flow from nonunionization, or
union from spending any part of their agency shop fees on political contributions unrelated
to the union's representation of their interests.
,e OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C)(Page Supp. 1983).
Ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(c), 61 Stat. 136, 142 (1947).
164 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1982).
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to threaten reprisals if a union is selected. ' "a On the other hand, the Gen-
eral Assembly's omission of such a clause could be argued to reflect a
legislative intention that Ohio's public employers confronting representa-
tion campaigns be constrained by a standard akin to that applied by the
NLRB in its interpretation of the original Wagner Act. Under the "8(c)-
less" Wagner Act, the NLRB broadly read the prohibition of employer
coercion to require strict neutrality of the employer during union organi-
zational drives.' Since the whole structure of Ohio's Act (like that of the
NLRA) contemplates periodic representation campaigns and a wide-
spread regimen of collective bargaining, unions would certainly not be ex-
pected to be neutral, so that such an interpretation would skew the infor-
mation and arguments reaching employees.
If SERB and the courts utilize this omission from the Act to "stack the
deck" in representation campaigns in favor of unionization by requiring
employer neutrality, countervailing ideas will have to be voiced outside
the workplace, in general public forums, and only by nonemployers. In
most cases, ideas expressed at such a distance from the workplace could
hardly be expected to have much impact at the scene of a representation
election. Under such an interpretation of the Act, the ability of employees
to acquire as much information as they otherwise might about the conse-
quences of the choices they must make will be impaired. In other words,
"' Cf. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(commercial speech promoting
contraception protected from total prohibition); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969)(Ku Klux Klan threats, through news media, of "revengeance" [sic] protected).
Although an employer's promises of benefit or threats of reprisal are likely to be far more
personalized than the communications found to be protected in the foregoing examples, the
employer's speech-if assessed solely under the Constitution-would be given broad
latitude.
The early NLRB summarized its approach to employer speech as follows:
Apart from discrimination against union members. . . the most common form of
interference with self-organization engaged in by employers is to spread propa-
ganda against unions and thus not only poison the minds of workers against them
but also indicate to them that the employers are antagonistic to unions and are
prepared to make this antagonism effective.
NLRB, 1 ANNUAL REPORT 73 (1936)(footnote omitted).
In upholding the Board's prophylactic approach, Judge Learned Hand articulated its ra-
tionale in terms so broad as to silence employers altogether: "What to an outsider will be no
more than vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation
of an intention which it is not safe to thwart." NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957
(2d Cir. 1941).
Although the Supreme Court furnished indications that the strict neutrality standard
might impinge upon employers' first amendment protections, see NLRB v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941)(employer's anti-union remarks evidence of unfair labor prac-
tice if coercive under the circumstances), the NLRB was slow to adjust its approach accord-
ingly. Consequently, Congress included section 8(c) in its 1947 amendments to the NLRA.
Although the new section did not go so far as to articulate a general first amendment stan-
dard, it did and does protect employers' anti-union speech falling short of threats of reprisal
or promises of benefit. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947).
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their effective right to make an informed choice would be diminished.
The evenhanded approach of the NLRA in this area clearly appears to
be more desirable, especially from the standpoint of enhancing public em-
ployee rights, than either requiring employer neutrality or placing no lim-
its on employer speech. The omission of a clause such as section 8(c) from
the Act, while regrettable, does not preclude SERB and the courts from
interpreting the Act in such manner.6 7 There is no other policy consider-
ation which requires a different result. In sum, there is no reason why the
employees' right to abstain from organizing should not be coextensive
with their right to organize.
Other points also deserve mention here. The voluntary recognition
clause in the Act at first glance appears to protect employees from impo-
sition of a representative upon them by agreement between the employer
and a union, based only upon a union's colorable claim of majority status.
The Act's procedure seems to provide that if such an agreement is con-
templated, notice, an opportunity to object, and involvement by an ad-
ministrative agency are required before a union can be foisted upon em-
ployees.168 In practice, however, SERB has interpreted the Act in a way
that gives public employees less protection than they would have as pri-
vate employees.
SERB has accomplished this by establishing several different rules.
First, it has determined that it must certify a union if the employer fails
to do anything in response to the voluntary recognition petition.'8 9 This
means that employees are deprived of their right to notice of the petition,
and thus of the right to file objections to the certification. Second, it has
determined that "substantial evidence" that a majority of employees do
not wish to be represented by any union is constituted by the signatures
' SERB has given an indication that it will follow such an approach, at least as far as
speech by unions is concerned. Stark County Engineer v. Am. Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, Council 8, 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. 2333 (SERB April 4,
1985). In dismissing an unfair labor practice charge that the union had violated the Act by
distributing false campaign leaflets, SERB stated:
The Board can find no violation of Section 4117.11(B)(1). The letter did not con-
tain language that would be determined to have a restraining or coercive effect.
Nor was it found to be misleading, the charge made by the charging party, which
in and of itself is not an unfair labor practice within Ohio Revised Code Section
4117.11.
Union campaign materials is unlikely to cast the employer in a favorable light,
but it does not form the basis for an unlawful charge.
Distribution of leaflets and flyers is an activity protected by the first amend-
ment and is not a violation of Ohio statutes.
In the absence of evidence that the union engaged in a restricting or coerceive
manner, the Board dismisses the charge for lack of probable cause.
Id. at 188.
168 Omo REv. CooE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(Page Supp. 1983).
169 See, e.g,, Laborers' and Mechanics' United, Local I City of Parma (NOPBA), I OIo
Pun. EMPLOYEE REP. 1 1043 (SERB June 20, 1984).
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of a majority of employees in the requested unit, in contrast with the test
for objecting to certification on the basis that another labor organization
should be certified, which requires the signatures of only ten percent of
the unit members. 17 0 Third, it has indicated that, even where an employer
objects to certification by petitioning for an election, the union must still
be certified without an election unless the employer's petition establishes
a question of representation, which, if there is no dispute about the ap-
propriateness of the unit, would require substantial evidence that a ma-
jority of employees do not want to be represented by the petitioning
union.' 7 1 This third approach is particularly unjustifiable. Not only does
it prevent employees from having a chance to vote by secret ballot, it
encourages-even requires-employers to engage in polling or interroga-
tion of employees about their union sentiments after a petition has been
filed. Such polling or interrogation may itself be disruptive of employee
rights. Hopefully, upon further reflection, SERB will change this view.
The Act's treatment of the decertification process constitutes another
deprivation of employee rights. Employees or unions seeking to obtain an
election to gain representation need to provide evidence of support from
only 30% of the employees in the unit.' Employees seeking an election
to decertify an incumbent representative must not only allege that a ma-
jority of employees no longer desire representation, but must, under
SERB's forms, provide proof of that fact to SERB in the form of signa-
tures of more than 50% of the employees in the unit or equivalent evi-
dence. In contrast is the requirement in the private sector, where only a
30% showing of interest is required for a decertification election.'7 The
30% test preserves more rights to employees-they are able to exercise a
greater right to choose, and more of them are able to exercise their choice
solely by secret ballot, rather than by having to sign a petition in front of
another employee and then make a choice in an election.
Finally, section 4(A) of the Act, if read literally, would prohibit any
individual from filing a decertification petition in a situation where a
public employer had recognized a labor organization as exclusive repre-
sentative through a written instrument prior to the effective date of the
Act. Section 4(A) provides that such a labor organization is deemed certi-
fied until it is challenged by another labor organization and SERB has
"o OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 4117.05(A)(2)(Page Supp. 1983). For further discussion of this
point, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
"l See Franklin Local Teachers Ass'n v. Franklin Local School Dist., I OHIO PUB. EM-
PLOYEE REP. 1308 (SERB Nov. 7, 1984), also discussed supra note 40. SERB has also as-
sumed the authority to certify a union without an election even where the employer objects
to the unit and the objections are found to have merit. In re Central State University, 2
OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. 2596 (SERB June 5, 1985).
"2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(1)(Page Supp. 1983).
"It Compare SERB Form ERB 2001 with NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASE-
HANDLING MANUAL (PART Two) REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS § 11022.3 (1984).
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certified an exclusive representative. 17 4 This complete deprivation of the
right to oust an incumbent union is without any justification, especially
when it is kept in mind that these pre-Act representation situations were
unlikely to have been entered into with any of the safeguards of employee
rights provided in the Act.
6. Synopsis
The Act has largely defined the scope of the individual public em-
ployee's rights in terms drawn from the NLRA. Assuming that there is to
be a system of collective bargaining through exclusive representation by
labor organizations in the public sector, these rights are appropriately
granted. The Act, however, through its failures to include a free speech
provision and to protect the rights of employees to obtain elections on the
same terms as unions can obtain them, fails to provide public employees
with all of the key. rights enjoyed by private sector employees.
B. Union Rights
The Act is not intended solely to provide individual workers with rights
enjoyed by their private sector counterparts; it is also intended to institu-
tionalize a system of collective bargaining that is based upon exclusive
representation by a labor organization. Moreover, the Act is further in-
tended to help unions. This section will explore some of the ways in
which the Act seeks to accomplish these goals.
1. The Use of Exclusive Representatives
As was outlined earlier, under the Act an employee representative certi-
fied by SERB is the exclusive representative of all employees in a bar-
gaining unit. While the private sector also employs the system of exclu-
sive bargaining representatives, whereby each appropriate bargaining unit
is represented by only one labor organization, it is not unthinkable that
other approaches could be used. indeed, in the public sector in Ohio,
nonexclusive representation, whereby a labor organization negotiates only
for such persons in the unit as may be its members, has existed in many
units of employees. In some cases, two or more unions have each repre-
sented some of the employees in a particular unit. These arrangements
"' See Am. Sub. S. B. No. 133, § 4, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-245 (Baldwin). SERB has
applied section 4 to prohibit an employer from seeking to modify a unit formulated before
the Act's passage. In re University of Cincinnati Hospital, 2 OtIo Pus. EMPLOYEE REP.
2603 (SERB May 25, 1985). The unit sought to be modified contained supervisors who, of
course, are not employees under the Act. See also New Miami Loc. School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE RF. 1 2661 (SERB Nov. 15, 1985)(only a rival union, and not
an employee had standing to file a decertification petition concerning a "deemed certified"
bargaining unit that had been "grandfathered" under the Act).
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are recognized in the Act and are "grandfathered.' 17 5
In the public sector particularly, the "members only" approach has sev-
eral things to be said for it. First, it avoids "free rider" problems for the
union and thereby obviates any basis for imposing agency fees upon non-
members with the attendant difficulties of staying within the constitu-
tional limits of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.7 ' Second, it does
not foreclose the employer and nonmember employees from discussing
matters of mutual concern. While such discussions may not be constitu-
tionally required under Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges
v. Knight,'77 they are certainly not prohibited. If the employer and non-
union employees or a "minority" union wish to engage in such discussion,
it is not necessarily inappropriate to permit them to do so. Third, if
strikes are to be permitted, as they are under the Act, complete disrup-
tion of public services may be avoided if there is a group of employees
who owe no allegiance to the striking labor organization, either through
membership or through a history of financial support. Such employees
would be less likely to strike.
On the other hand, exclusive representation makes it easier for man-
agement to deal with the bargaining unit. Once a deal is struck with the
exclusive representative, management need not consider other arrange-
ments for other labor organizations or for individual employees. There is
only one labor organization that can strike, and there are no interunion
rivalries creating extra pressures for strikes. Finally, exclusive representa-
tion, especially when coupled with union security arrangements,'178
strengthens unions. The exclusive representative becomes the only entity
that can negotiate. Employees who would have their voices heard must,
for the most part, operate through the union.17 The employer cannot ne-
gotiate with employees even if it wants to, for to do so would be a refusal
to bargain in good faith with the exclusive representative. ' Requiring
employees to join the union or support it with agency or "fair share" fees
creates a pressure on those employees to support the union, otherwise the
employees will perceive that they are simply throwing their money away
to no purpose.'
Am. Sub. S.B. No. 133, § 4, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-245 (Baldwin).
l See supra note 161.
177 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984). See supra note 111.
171 See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
171 See e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (concerted protest activity by minority subgroup of private sector union not protected
under NLRA § 7 from employer reprisals; subgroup must rely on union's representation
through bargaining and grievance processes and act in concert with union to obtain
protection).
"' See, e.g., NLRB v. West Sand & Gravel Co., 612 F.2d 1326, 1328 (1st Cir. 1979).
... Many psychologists have noted the power of a phenomenon called cognitive disso-
nance in shaping behavior. Generally, the theory of cognitive dissonance holds that dishar-
mony among one's beliefs, feelings, and behavior tends to create a strong internal pressure
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In conclusion, the exclusive representation system will, to some extent,
diminish individual employee rights. However, it will significantly
strengthen labor organizations. The system will make it easier for such
organizations to obtain the monetary support and emotional allegiance of
employees. Such support should result in both the reaching of collective
agreements which are more favorable to employees and their unions than
might otherwise be possible and, in turn, enhanced employee support for
their unions. Thus, in this instance, the diminution of individual rights
may be justified.
2. The Granting of Differential Rights to Unions
A second major way the Act assists unions is by setting up systems and
procedures that are available only to unions or are available on better
terms to unions than to individual employees. While there are several ex-
amples of this, two are of special note.
The first example is found in the recognition process. If a union de-
mands recognition from an employer, the employer may request an elec-
tion, or, if it does not do so, SERB may certify the union unless one of
three conditions prevail, 182 two of which are relevant to this discussion.
One condition is that SERB receives substantial evidence that a majority
of employees in the unit do not wish to be represented by the employee
organization requesting recognition. ' The other relevant condition is
that SERB receives substantial evidence that at least 10% of the employ-
ees in the unit wish to be represented by another employee organiza-
tion." 4 Thus, employees who wish to avoid a certification without an elec-
tion must obtain and submit, within twenty-one days from the date of an
employee organization's request for recognition, signatures from over
50% of the employees. Employees or other labor organizations seeking to
secure union representation, but by another union, need only obtain at
least 10% support.
This disparity has no discernible basis in logic. Unlike the situation in
the private sector, where the 10% figure is used for purposes of interven-
ing in an election, the question is not simply one of who gets on a ballot
for an election that is going to be held anyway. The question is whether
there will be an election at all. If an employer does not seek an election, a
union has a dramatically easier time preventing certification of another
union without an election than do employees who want no union at all.
to bring them into alignment. When external controls on behavior make that behavior diffi-
cult to change, discomfort with cognitive dissonance will often lead to a conforming realign-
ment of beliefs and feelings. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE Disso-
NANCE (1957); cf. G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946)("Four legs good, two legs bad!").
'8' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii)-(iv)(Page Supp. 1983).
83 See id.
'" See id.
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Again, this clearly increases the chances that there will be some union
representing a unit, thereby increasing overall union strength.
The second example is found in the area of strike activity. Nonsafety
related public employees have a right to strike, but not until their exclu-
sive representative has completed the Act's impasse procedures and given
a ten-day prior written notice of an intent to strike to the public em-
ployer.18 Individual employees are prohibited from committing unfair la-
bor practices, one of which is to "engage in any picketing, striking or
other concerted refusal to work" without the ten days' advance written
notice having been given.' The notice must be given by the exclusive
representative and must follow exhaustion of the impasse procedures. Ac-
cordingly, it is to be concluded that the Act does not authorize strikes by
unrepresented employees, since, by definition, they cannot meet the pre-
requisites for a legal strike.
This approach differs from that of the NLRA system, where protected
concerted activity includes strikes by private employees even if they are
not represented by a union.187 In Ohio, public employees must now
"purchase" a right to strike by selecting an employee organization as
their exclusive representative. While there is justification for protecting
employers from unpredictable strikes, or from strikes occurring before av-
enues of settlement have been tried, those concerns could have been satis-
fied without making selection of a union a necessary precondition to the
exercise of a right otherwise granted by the Act.' 8
3. The Structure of Bargaining Power
The third major way in which the Act assists labor organizations is by
adjusting the parameters of the bargaining process to make it easier for
labor organizations to obtain their institutional bargaining objectives and
thereby to make it more attractive for employees to choose to be repre-
sented. One example of this is the Act's provision which makes employer
lockouts an unfair labor practice.' 89 This proscription has two effects,
both favorable to unions. First, it removes a risk faced by an employee
who is deciding whether to join a labor organization. He simply does not
l Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
'Be Id. § 4117.11(B)(8).
", See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
The legislature could have enabled all public employees to provide notice of a collec-
tive dispute along with a specification of the reasons therefor. In the case of a controversy
that does not concern the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, the legislature
could have provided for a brief (not to exceed 30 days) period of mediation, followed by the
issuance of the 10-day notice. In this way, unorganized employees could have been accorded
the right to take collective action. As an incidental effect, employees would also have been
able to have the option of selecting union representation without having to pursue a collec-
tive bargaining agreement as an eventual goal.
"I OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(7)(Page Supp. 1983).
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have a worry about being locked out. Thus, organizing is facilitated. Sec-
ond, public employers have been denied the use of a sanction that can be
used by private sector employers to help secure the acceptance of their
proposals or the withdrawal of union proposals. Thus, it is more likely
that public sector unions will be successful in pressing their demands.
This will also aid unions in selling themselves to employees.
Another example is that the Act requires certain specific contract pro-
visions that are of institutional importance to employee organizations.
These provisions involve grievance procedures 90 and dues check-off.191 In
the absence of a legal compulsion, unions would have to use some of their
bargaining strength to obtain these items. The Act, however, hands them
to unions, thereby leaving union bargaining power available for other
items.
For safety organizations, the Act's prohibition of strikes and lockouts
and imposition of compulsory arbitration make joining a union essentially
risk free. Moreover, arbitration is available only for represented employ-
ees. Accordingly, unless the public employer establishes some equivalent
mechanism for unrepresented employees, union efforts to organize safety
employees are likely to be extremely successful, once again resulting in
increased labor organization strength.
Finally, a discussion of the Act's treatment of union rights would not
be complete without at least some mention of its special handling of cer-
tain labor organizations. In several instances, the Act makes special rules,
or creates exceptions to general rules, for the obvious purpose of satisfy-
ing the desires of particular unions. For instance, the Act provides a gen-
eral definition of the term "supervisor," based upon an employee's duties,
coupled with a general prohibition against supervisors being considered
employees. The Act then declares, however, that no one in a police or fire
department, except the chief, is a supervisor, no matter what his duties
are. "'92 The sole reason for this exception is the fact that existing police
and fire unions represent, and want to continue to represent, supervisory
employees in those departments. Similarly, a "management level em-
ployee" is defined in the Act as an individual who formulates or directs
the implementation of policy, and such employees are excluded from the
Act's definition of employees." 3 However, the Act then states that faculty
members in institutions of higher education are not management level
employees even if they formulate and implement academic or institution
policy.' 9" Again, this provision was attached because existing faculty un-
190 Id. § 4117.09(B)(1). This is coupled with an unfair labor practice provision forbidding
employers from engaging in a pattern or practice of refusing to process grievances. See
supra note 139 and accompanying text.
'0' OHIO RRV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(B)(2)(Page Supp. 1983).
192 Id. § 4117.01(F)(2).
193 Id. § 4117.01(K).
194 Id.
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ions want two things: 1) to represent faculty even if the faculty has pol-
icy-making responsibility; and 2) to retain such policy-making responsi-
bility for the faculty."'
Other examples are the Act's special rules for police (but not fire) de-
partment units, separating employees by rank; 96 academic units;" 7 and
uniformed employee units. 198 All of these provisions were designed in ac-
cordance with the desire of existing labor organizations.
4. Synopsis
The various factors discussed in this section demonstrate that the Act
is structured so as to increase the ability of unions to organize public em-
ployees, to make it easier for them to realize bargaining goals, and to
make them more fiscally sound and therefore politically influential. The
Act, as drafted, will undoubtedly be successful in its aim of assisting un-
ions. Public employee unions will become a much more powerful force in
Ohio.
A number of the structural aids for unions carved into the Act do not
appear to have been appropriate and necessary. The limiting of the right
to strike to represented employees, the requiring of certain contract pro-
visions, and the carving out of exceptions from general rules simply to
meet the desires of certain unions are not clearly justified.
C. The Act's Effect on the Democratic System
The NLRA has been widely hailed from its inception as a kind of na-
tional insurance policy for democratic institutions and ideals. The argu-
ments to this effect run as follows:
a) The NLRA has permitted many who would otherwise lead
down-trodden lives to gain an economic stake in our society and
its political institutions that is worthy of defending, and thus has
kept the disaffected underclass confined to manageable
numbers. 9
b) The NLRA has substituted for industrialist hegemony in the
. Many private sector faculty unions undoubtedly share the same wishes, but that did
not stop the Supreme Court of the United States from holding that faculty members at
private institutions who participate in institutional governance are within the NLRA's ex-
emption for managerial employees, largely on the basis of the inseparability of their profes-
sional interests and the interests of their institution. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,
688 (1980). The Act's treatment of comparable public sector faculty members appears to be
designed to foreclose a SERB or Ohio court decision along the lines of that in Yeshiva.
I Oro REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(D)(6)(Page Supp- 1983).
197 Id. § 4117.06(D)(4).
198 Id. § 4117.06(D)(2).
I See generally Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J.
1509 (1981).
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workplace a brand of industrial democracy that gives workers ex-
perience in, and abiding trust for, the democratic institutions of
American society at large. 00
c) Even if the two prior generalizations are false, the NLRA was
enacted just in time to prevent labor strife from erupting into
general social upheaval and has succeeded in keeping private sec-
tor workers adequately preoccupied with the politics of the work-
place ever since.
20 1
Any or all of these statements may be adequate to justify the regime of
the NLRA without regard to its effects upon commerce, income distribu-
tion, and productivity. Where the Ohio Act is concerned, however, none
of the three foregoing statements can be said to be applicable. As of 1983,
Ohio's public employees could not fairly have been characterized as eco-
nomically downtrodden and lacking an economic stake in society. They
were not segregated from the workings of democratic institutions; instead,
they were a part of them. Additionally, in 1983 and the years immediately
prior thereto, they were not threatening, or engaged in, strikes suffi-
ciently massive so as to threaten to destroy Ohio's democratic institu-
tions. The question now is what the Act has done to Ohio's democratic
institutions.
Perhaps the most important issue in the area of public employee bar-
gaining is the extent to which collective bargaining is antithetical to the
democratic process. The model of the democratic process usually envi-
sioned for such an analysis is one in which competing interest groups at-
tempt to influence governmental decision making. This influence is ac-
complished by providing information to decision makers, by forming
coalitions, and by pursuing compromise processes, all of which are ulti-
mately based upon actual or threatened use of the ballot box to support
friends and oust foes. Within constitutional limits, the outcome of the
process is thought to result not necessarily from any inherent "right" or
"wrong" or from any efficiency or inefficiency in economic terms, but
from the ballot box, including anticipated, imagined, and real results.
A collective bargaining system in the public sector can be said to be
inconsistent with this democratic system because it gives one type of in-
terest group two distinct advantages over other interest groups. The first
advantage is access to government in a forum not available to other
groups-namely the collective bargaining table. The second advantage is
See generally Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt.
1), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947).
For a brief account of the volatile state of labor-management relations between 1890
and 1935, see BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 1, at 13-25.
For a study of contemporary labor unrest in both the private and the public sectors, see
A. THIERLOT & T. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS,
LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB (1983).
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the ability to exert pressure in ways that are not ultimately dependent
upon the ballot box-namely, work stoppages or interest arbitration.
1. Management Rights
One particular aspect of the functioning of collective bargaining in the
public sector is of special note. As indicated, the common vision of de-
mocracy is that of the office holder as something of a reed in the wind,
responding to outside political pressures and internal principles without a
strong personal stake in any particular outcome. (If there is a personal
stake, the cry of "conflict of interest" is heard.) In a system of collective
bargaining, it will be this public official who responds not only to conven-
tional political pressure, but also to a variety of demands from employee
representatives. Significantly, some of the latter demands may involve the
removal of items from the political arena almost entirely. There is very
little incentive to resist such demands, particularly when there is no cur-
rent "live" issue.
An example may illustrate this point. Assume that a city has a practice
of using two police officers per patrol car. A crime wave leads to a public
outcry for a more visible police presence. In the absence of any bargaining
impediment, one possible response of the city would be the deployment of
a number of one-officer patrol cars. While the police would perhaps ob-
ject, the citizenry would have the ability to urge this approach on their
elected officials as being preferable to raising taxes for new police officers.
Suppose, however, that in negotiations concluded prior to the crime wave,
the police patrolmen's union had obtained a contract provision to the ef-
fect that current manning arrangements would be maintained until such
time as mutually otherwise agreed by the employer and the union. Under
such circumstances the issue of moving from two-officer to one-officer pa-
trols cannot be resolved in the political process, but must be handled in a
collective bargaining setting where the union holds a veto power.20 2
The foregoing example illustrates the special importance of "manage-
ment rights" in the public sector. The choice of what rights are reserved
to management is not simply one of which subjects may be discussed in
bargaining or may be acted upon unilaterally by management; rather, the
choice becomes one between bargaining on the one hand and political ac-
countability on the other. A rejection of one option by a mayor on an
issue such as police manning is one for which the mayor can be held to
answer to the electorate. However, not choosing an option that does not
exist, due to its having been excluded from the realm of unilateral action,
202 This example illustrates why bargaining is needed, as well as why it is undemocratic.
The choice of one-person patrols maximizes police presence and minimizes costs to taxpay-
ers; it may also have an adverse impact on the safety of police officers. The voting public
may "undervalue" police safety and thus be willing to yield it in exchange for more police
visibility and no new taxes-though one might question whether this is a good result.
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is not likely to be a political issue at all.
The Act does give attention to this issue; it contains a provision which
purports to establish management rights.20 3 However, it is doubtful that
the provision, as written, will in fact preserve very many issues for the
political arena.
The Act's provision indicates that where a collective bargaining agree-
ment is silent, nothing in the agreement impairs the right and responsi-
bility of the public employer to take action in nine broadly defined areas,
generally regarded as involving management rights.20 4 This provision thus
putatively adopts the "reserved rights" doctrine, often employed by arbi-
trators 05 in interpreting contracts to allow unilateral action, rather than
the "clear and unmistakable waiver" doctrine employed by the NLRB.0 e
The Act also initially provides that the public employer need not even
bargain over these issues. 07 However, the Act then sets forth an excep-
tion. Bargaining is required on subjects "reserved" to management if they
affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment, or the continu-
ation, modification, or deletion of an existing term in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 0 8 It is difficult to conceive of an issue that would concern
0 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C)(Page Supp. 1983), which provides:
Unless a public employer agrees otherwise in a collective bargaining agreement,
nothing in Chapter 4117 of the Revised Code impairs the right and responsibility
of each public employer to:
(1) Determine matters of inherent managerial policy which include, but are not
limited to, areas of discretion or policy such as the functions and programs of the
public employer, standards of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology,
and organizational structure;
(2) Direct, supervise, evaluate, or hire employees;
(3) Maintain and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental
operations;
(4) Determine the overall methods, process, means, or personnel by which gov-
ernmental operations are to be conducted;
(5) Suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause, or lay off, transfer,
assign, schedule, promote, or retain employees;
(6) Determine the adequacy of the work force;
(7) Determine the overall mission of the employer as a unit of government;
(8) Effectively manage the work force;
(9) Take actions to carry out the mission of the public employer as a govern-
mental unit.
The employer is not required to bargain on subjects reserved to the manage-
ment and direction of the governmental unit except as they affect wages, hours,
terms, and conditions of employment, and the continuation, modification, or dele-
tion of an existing provision of a collective bargaining agreement. A public em-
ployee or exclusive representative may raise a legitimate complaint or file a griev-
ance based on the collective bargaining agreement.
2O, See id.
See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 632 (1978)(Ross, Arb.).
See, e.g., Laredo Packing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1 (1981).
27 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C)(Page Supp. 1983).
2.. 11
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employees enough to create a desire for bargaining but would not fall
within the exception. In the prior example concerning the manning of po-
lice cars, the determination would be a management right, under several
of the nine areas. However, the impact of the decision on safety of the
police would clearly place it within the scope of the exception. Accord-
ingly, the union could compel bargaining over the issue.
Similarly, the union could compel bargaining over a proposal to include
in a contract a provision perpetuating past practices. This proposal could
be pressed to impasse or arbitration. Assuming that the public employer
has no desire to change current practices, there is little incentive for the
employer to resist such a proposal vigorously. On the other hand, if the
employer resists the union demand, it will be in a position of defending a
position to the electorate or the arbitrator that goes something like: "I do
not want to agree to continue existing practices, even though there is
nothing I want to change now, because I may want, at some time in the
future, to alter them, increasing the hazards faced by the police, so as to
avoid hiring new police and raising taxes." On the other hand, if the em-
ployer goes along with the union, it can hope to gain some immediate
concession, take a step toward resolving the current negotiations with the
union, and perhaps just as important for the employer, establish a situa-
tion in which it will not have to make a difficult choice in the future,
since the labor agreement has foreclosed an option.
Accordingly, due to its exception to the management rights clause and
the inherent incentives facing public employers, the Ohio Act does not
remove, in an effective way, management rights (or, in this context, the
right to "take actions to carry out the mission of the public employer as a
governmental unit") from the scope of mandatory or permissive bargain-
ing. Therefore, it encourages the removal of vital political issues from the
political arena.
This scope of bargaining problem is even more troublesome in Ohio
then it might otherwise be because, under the Ohio Act, as has been al-
luded to earlier and will be discussed in more detail later, 0 9 collective
bargaining agreements may supersede inconsistent local and state laws.
Thus, when the parties sit down to bargain about virtually whatever they
please, they will, to the extent of the bargaining unit, be deciding what
the law will be in their community.1 0
'0 See infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
20 This very thing has occurred in the city of Cleveland, where a charter amendment
establishing a civilian police review board was passed on November 6, 1984. The amend-
ment was voided, however, on December 19, 1984 by Judge James Kilcoyne on the basis
that the police review board introduced an additional step into the disciplinary process for
police and thereby conflicted with the collective bargaining agreements covering police pa-
trolmen and other police officers. Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections No. 82509
(C.P. Cuyahoga County Dec. 19, 1984). The decision is currently being appealed. Jurcisin v.
Cuyahoga County Ed. of Elections, No. 49764 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. filed Jan. 22, 1985).
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The Ohio legislature would have better served the public if it had made
some real effort to determine what subjects should have been effectively
removed from the bargaining table-rather than purporting to remove
items from the table with one hand while placing them back on the table
with the other. Certainly, the legislature would have altered the demo-
cratic process less if it had limited collective bargaining to wages, hours,
and other "traditional" subjects of bargaining. Absent such approach, the
legislature would have served the democratic process by requiring, within
reasonable limits, public notice of certain aspects of bargaining and re-
quiring the bargaining parties to accept public input regarding those
aspects.""
2. The Right to Strike
a. Permitted Strikes
Since one of the usually-cited goals of bargaining statutes is labor
peace, it seems paradoxical that such a statute would grant employees the
right to strike. However, it is thought, at least in the private sector, that
the collective bargaining process regularizes labor relations and channels
unrest into the bargaining process. Collective bargaining thus reduces
pressures for strikes. However, the argument goes, meaningful collective
bargaining cannot exist without being attended by some ultimate sanc-
tion which may be invoked when agreements are not otherwise reached." 2
The basic choices for this sanction are strikes and arbitration. Viewed in
this way, the right to strike is a tool that is used only so that collective
bargaining will be an acceptable, useful system.
In the public sector, there has been unwillingness to legitimize the
strike weapon."' Often it is felt that forcing the parties to get together at
a bargaining table is enough incentive to produce agreement or labor
peace in most situations without the disruption of the processes of gov-
ernment that strikes entail. The Act's basic system, however, is to permit
the strike as an ultimate sanction in all but units of safety related em-
I'l See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES, supra note 87 at 868-
69. The Act specifically exempts collective bargaining meetings from "open meetings" laws.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.21 (Page Supp. 1983).
A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 483-85 (9th ed. 1981).
21s Only the following states have enacted legislation permitting public employees a lim-
ited right to strike: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984); California, CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1962 (West 1971); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1983); Illinois, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 1617 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.18
(West Supp. 1985); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 (1983); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4117.14 (Page Supp. 1985); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1983); Pennsylvania,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.21, § 1730
(1978); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.06 (West 1974).
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ployees,1 4 while also providing enough alternative dispute resolution sys-
tems so that the strike will be used only as a last resort. The issue is
whether the Act's grant of a right to strike will ensure that collective bar-
gaining works, increase labor peace, and thereby minimize interference
with democracy.
In this regard, the following points can be made:
1. The Act will probably succeed in eliminating or channeling
pressures for strikes over "procedural" issues-such as recogni-
tion, jurisdiction, etc.-because it provides effective and expedi-
tious ways of resolving them;
2. Prior to the Act's enactment in 1983, Ohio did experience a
number of public employee strikes each year.21 8 There is room for
improvement in this record, so there is some justification for a
legislative effort to reduce strikes;
3. The procedural hurdles should result in the issues being clear
and fixed by the time any strike could occur;
4. The ten-day notice provision, if not permitted to be abused,
may help public employers avoid some of the most harmful ef-
fects of strikes on their constituents;
5. By providing several dispute resolution methods, and at early
points in negotiations, the Act reduces the odds that any of them
will produce agreement. For example, one of the ways mediators
"lead" parties to make concessions is the use of the pressure of
the threat of an imminent strike.2 16 The Act, however, uses medi-
ation so early in the procedure (and then replaces it with
factfinding) that it is unlikely that mediation will result in real
concessions on the very tough issues.
6. The Act will probably reduce the number of strikes in in-
stances in which the Act makes strikes illegal because it has pro-
vided the alternative of SERB administrative procedure and
mandatory arbitration.
One aspect of the impasse procedure-factfinding-deserves special
consideration. Factfinding is to take place beginning thirty days prior to
the expiration of the bargaining period.2 17 Factfinders are required to
conduct a hearing at which they will receive the positions of the parties
and the parties' arguments in support of them. They then are to issue a
report containing recommendations as to settlement.2 18 As previously
" See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
2, O'Reilly and Gath, Structure and Conflicts: Ohio's Collective Bargaining Law for
Public Employees, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (1983).
16 Buckingham, Variables Affecting Mediation Outcome, 3 PEACE & CHANGE 55 (Sum-
mer 1982).
21 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(3)(Page Supp. 1983).
2l8 Id. § 4117.14(C)(3)(a).
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noted, the employer's legislative body then has only seven days to reject
the recommendation, and it must do so by a supermajority of three fifths.
The seven-day period runs even if the body is not in session, and the
three-fifths vote required is of the entire membership of the body, not
just of those present and voting. Only if the factfinders' recommendations
are rejected are the positions of the parties and the factfinders' recom-
mendations made public.219
Not only is the public kept ignorant of the key factors until after it is
too late to prevent adoption of the factfinders' report, it is also prevented
from having any input to the factfinders. The Act specifically prohibits
any member of the factfinding panel from having any discussion of its
possible recommendations with anyone other than parties to the dis-
pute.2 2 The legislature's imposition of such a system clearly exacerbates
the antidemocratic effects of the collective bargaining process; it is diffi-
cult to discern any justification sufficient to outweigh the harm involved.
After factfinding, certain strikes are authorized by the Act. Where the
Act makes strikes legal, it will increase the power of unions, in compari-
son with both the public employer and nonunion interest groups. As al-
ready noted,2 21 the Act also facilitates organizing, meaning that more em-
ployees will join unions, and reduces the risks faced by employees and
unions that go on strike. Thus, it seems inevitable that the Act will make
unions more willing to back up their demands with strike actions. When
these factors are coupled with the Act's misguided attempt to reduce ar-
eas of discord by employing a very complex and ineffectual impasse reso-
lution scheme, which will leave major issues clear but uncompromised,
the conclusion that there will be more public sector strikes in Ohio seems
unavoidable, unless of course, public employers simply capitulate. In any
case, the ultimate post-Act points of settlement will undoubtedly be sub-
stantially more favorable to unions than were the pre-Act points.
Of course, this does not mean that unions will win every battle. As
noted earlier,222 the strike in the public sector is a political weapon, not
an economic one. Therefore, it is susceptible to political counterattack, or
even to backfiring. If the union does not succeed in generating public
support for its position, but instead generates public resistance, the union
may not "win" the strike.
Whether unions win or lose their battles with public employers, the
fact of the matter is that they have been granted access to a unique field
of conflict, one from which other groups are barred as direct combatants,
but into which those groups are compelled to enter for purposes of endur-
ing the pain caused by the strike. A neighborhood group cannot go on
I2 d. § 4117.14(C)(6).
220 Id. § 4117.14(C)(4)(f).
22 See supra text accompanying notes 175-98.
212 See supra text accompanying note 101.
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strike in support of its demand for better waste collection service, but it
can be required to put up with piles of refuse during a garbage strike.
The people with the most at stake in a strike are not the employer and
the union involved in the strike. Ironically the parties with the most at
stake-the citizens of a community-may be excluded even from ob-
taining any information more recent than the factfinder's report about
the positions of the parties.
The Act's legitimization of the strike weapon thus places labor organi-
zations at a distinct advantage over other interest groups and alters the
democratic process. Checks upon a labor organization's use of this power
do exist. They consist of some level of public resistance to taxes and to
union tactics that will come to be reflected in management posi-
tions-inspired by the threat of being ousted by voters-and the exis-
tence of other labor organizations also seeking a greater share of the em-
ployer's budget (some of whom have the ability to go to interest
arbitration). Those checks will probably not be encountered until the
union has gone some distance, and will be exercised basically as "vetos,"
rather than as parts of the process of formulating positions. The effective-
ness of those checks would have been enhanced and the Act's alteration
of the democratic process diminished if the legislators had incorporated
into the Act's terms some provision requiring that employers and striking
unions make available to the public at appropriate times information con-
cerning the parties' positions. Individual citizens and community groups
would then have had at least some of the information necessary to enable
them to attempt to coalesce wider public support and exert influence
upon the employer and the union. As alluded to earlier, as the Act stands,
community groups may well have available to them as a strike proceeds
no meaningful information concerning potential costs of an employer's
capitulation to a union's demands.
b. Prohibited Strikes and Their Substitutes
The prior lack of legislative authorization for public sector strikes has
not prevented them from occurring. Such strikes have ranged from half-
day walkouts by city of Cleveland Municipal Light & Power employees
over a request to string Christmas lights,2 22 to the recordsetting strike by
Ravenna teachers,2 24 to the devasting strike by Dayton firefighters.2 5
They have included slowdowns, "blue flu," sick outs, and other measures.
An interesting feature of these illegal strikes is that the Ferguson Act's
sanctions, consisting principally of the employer's right to discharge all
striking employees, were only rarely used. In most cases, the response of
the public employer was to seek an injunction on the basis that strikes
2 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 15, 1983, at 18.
2 Id., Dec. 13, 1980, at 3-B.
22 Id., Aug. 10, 1977, at 1-A, 13-A.
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were unlawful at common law as well as by statute, and that the statutory
framework was not exclusive.2 " This unwillingness to employ the Fergu-
son Act stemmed from its political unpalatability, due in part to its se-
vere penalties. Now, since organized labor has so strongly supported the
new Act, it may not be politically suicidal for politicians to utilize its
sanctions.
Because of this factor of greater palatability, it is likely that the sanc-
tions of the Ohio Act will be invoked. In the two specific areas where the
Act prohibits economic strikes-i) any strike by safety related employees;
and 2) any strike not following exhaustion of the impasse procedures and
a ten-day notice from the involved union22 7-it will probably be more ef-
fective in punishing strikes than the Ferguson Act would have been in
those identical situations. That the Act will not have as much deterrent
effect as did the Ferguson Act upon strikes that the Act now makes legal
is perhaps too obvious to state.
i. Strikes by Safety Related Employees and the Alternative of
Conciliation
Even in the case of "safety forces" where the Act accords no right to
strike, and even if the Act is completely successful in eliminating all
strikes by such employees, the Act enhances their position relative to par-
ent groups, welfare rights organizations, corporate lobbies, and all other
interest groups. The Act does so by: 1) requiring collective bargaining,
and 2) requiring arbitration over contract terms. The effect of requiring
collective bargaining has already been discussed. However, a few addi-
tional points can be made in this context. The basic conflict in this area
concerns the direction of the expenditure of public funds. Money spent
on higher salaries for state employees is not available for grants to local
boards of education. Money spent on police officers is not available to
purchase new fire trucks. Money spent on raises for current clerks is not
available to hire more of them. As the overall tolerance of taxpayers for
new taxes decreases, the total amount of funding available to public enti-
ties becomes limited, with the result that money spent by one public em-
ployer may affect the amount of money available for use by a completely
different public employer. When this inherent conflict over public money
is coupled with potential conflicts over noneconomic items, and one inter-
est group is then given the opportunity to compel bargaining in a forum
from which competing groups are excluded, the balance of power is
... Goldberg v. City of Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St. 2d 228, 271 N.E.2d 284 (1971).
... There is another important category to consider-strikes that are otherwise legal but
are enjoinable for a period of time upon a showing of a danger to health and safety. See
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.16 (Page Supp. 1983). The Act, however, does not provide
sanctions for violating the injunction. Presumably it would be up to the court to utilize its
contempt power as in any instance of disobedience of an injunction.
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altered.
For employees who do not have the right to strike, the Ohio Act pro-
vides the strike substitute of compulsory interest arbitration.2 This pro-
cess not only gives the advantage of yet another separate forum to the
labor organization, but also insulates the gains achieved there from at-
tack. A mayor who takes a strong public stand opposing pay raises for
city workers, because of his desire to advance a politically popular pro-
gram to reduce existing taxes, can hardly be attacked by the electorate if
an arbitrator grants the raises. Most probably the mayor will denounce
the arbitrator, take credit for fighting the good fight, and leave taxes
where they are. What then can the voters do? They can achieve nothing
by removing the incumbent because the incumbent is on their side; they
cannot seek a tax reduction and receive the same service, because the
raises are in place and the city could react to a revenue reduction only be
reducing employees and services; and they cannot pass an initiative ordi-
nance rescinding the agreement resulting from the arbitration award, be-
cause the Act makes the award a "binding mandate" on the employer to
take all steps necessary to implement the award .2 2 In this way, matters
of key political importance are simply removed from the political process.
An arbitrator does not function as a part of the political process nor-
mally used to run government. The Ohio Act specifies the factors that the
arbitrator is to consider: a) past agreements between the parties; b) the
terms and conditions of employment of public and private employees do-
ing comparable work; c) the interests and welfare of the public, including
the ability of the public employer to finance the settlement proposed; d)
the "lawful authority of the public employer"; and e) the stipulations of
the parties.2 '0 Arbitrators may also consider such other factors as are nor-
mally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of
the issues submitted to final offer settlement.22 ' Nowhere in the statute is
there a direction to consider what the electorate would vote for if faced
with the choice. Of course, in some ways, that may be a good thing. The
late president of the American Federal of State, County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO, Jerry Wurf, commented about arbitration as
follows:
The results haven't always been great, but we have found that
228 Id. § 4117.14(D)(1). For articles addressing the merits of compulsory binding arbitra-
tion, see Clemow & Mooney, Impasse Resolution in Local Government Labor Relations:
The Connecticut Approach, 9 CONN. L. REV. 579 (1977); Lampke, Binding Arbitration and
the New Massachusetts Bargaining Law, 11 NEw ENG. L_ REV, 137 (1975); McAvoy, Binding
Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Pub-
lic Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1205 (1972); Sullivan, Binding Arbitration in Public
Employment Labor Disputes, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 666 (1967).
22 O1lo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(I)(Page Supp. 1983).
230 Id. § 411 7.14(G)(7)(a)-(e).
23. Id. § 4117.14(G)(7)(f).
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arbitration has frequently been able to deal with problems that
might have been very difficult to deal with at the bargaining ta-
ble. One interesting thing we found is that management was more
worried about arbitration than the unions, because management
found that arbitrators often dealt with the equities of the situa-
tion instead of the politics of it.
. . . . Arbitrators look at ability to pay, not whether a Republican
or Democrat should look good for the next election."3
The Ohio Act has clearly adopted the approach of seeking the supposed
"equity" as between the positions of unions and public employers in pref-
erence to "the politics" of them. This choice may be expected to result in
decisions that are acceptable in most instances, at least once the parties
realize the decisions are final. However, it is also likely that there will be
a small minority of decisions that are totally unacceptable and these will
be the ones that receive disproportionate attention. The lack of an effec-
tive means to address them, even through some extraordinary process
such as initiative or referendum, is likely to strengthen feelings of
powerlessness or disenfranchisement in political groups who generally
have little influence but could generate enough support to overturn an
unfavorable award, if only it were possible under the Act.
While it may be assumed that arbitrators will do their best to apply the
statutory criteria to the facts of each controversy so as to arrive at a good
result, it must be remembered that democracy is not designed to achieve
results that some individual might perceive as good. Rather, it is designed
to provide a process whereby the results reached are those that, within
constitutional limits, reflect the will of the majority.
All this having been said, however, it is also true that the Act does not
write on a blank slate. In providing an arbitration alternative, the legisla-
ture was aware that many of the individuals denied the right to strike in
the Act are organized.2  They have exercised the strike method, and as
noted, have not always suffered Ferguson Act sanctions. Since the em-
ployees denied the right to strike in the Act are the employees most able
to cripple governmental operations and create "pain" in the citizenry
through a strike, and since nothing but arbitration was seen as sufficient
to avoid strikes over impasse issues, the legislators apparently felt they
faced the alternatives of 1) arbitration, 2) punishment for striking, and 3)
allowing strikes. Punishment, standing alone, would likely have been no
more effective in deterring strikes than the Ferguson Act was. That alter-
native was rejected. As between strikes and arbitration, the choice was
,5 Burnett, Jerry Wurf, SKEPTIC MAG., May-June 1976, at 10, 14.
,3' See Transcript of the Hearings Before the Subcomm. on S.B. 133 of the Senate Com-
merce and Labor Committee of the Ohio Senate, 115th Gen. Assembly (1983)(testimony
given in the second and third hearings on March 28, 1983, and in the fifth and sixth hear-
ings on April 6, 1983).
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arbitration. While arbitration is undemocratic, so is the settlement of is-
sues through strikes. Strikes by safety forces are particularly undemo-
cratic, because the population affected is so vulnerable. Welfare mothers,
for example, might have more left to them in arbitration proceedings in-
volving fire fighter pay than they would if there were a fire fighter strike.
The use of a strike, however, does preserve to the voters the theoretical
possibility of voting out the officials who agree to any settlement, and of
having the legislative body reject the agreement reached.
As has been demonstrated, the democratic process has been completely
altered where the Act employs its system of interest arbitration. The
democratic process would have been less diminished, and the Act's sys-
tem of interest arbitration sustained nonetheless, if the legislature had
established, wikhin prescribed general limits, public participation in the
arbitration proceedings. The legislature might have established basic
qualifications for individual citizen and community group intervenors and
have required that arbitrators permit such persons to present evidence at
arbitration hearings, with the arbitrator retaining the same control and
discretion with respect to the evidence presented by such persons as with
respect to that presented by employers and unions. In order for such citi-
zen participation to be meaningful, the legislators would also have had to
require that information about the positions of employers and unions be
made available to intervenors prior to the commencement of formal
hearings.
ii. Strikes Without Advance Notice
Another type of strike that the Act prohibits is one that occurs without
exhaustion of impasse procedures and the provision of a ten-day notice
by the labor organization. Those impasse procedures have already been
discussed.2 3 4 Only a few points need to be discussed concerning the re-
quirement of advance notice of strikes. Although the notice period can
help the public employer prepare to mitigate the likely worst effect of a
strike, the requirement of a notice before a strike does not diminish the
power of the labor organization. In some ways, it enhances it. The threat
of a strike can, in some cases, be nearly as effective in inducing conces-
sions as an actual strike. An actual strike can harden positions and can
make residents unhappy with the striking employees. A strike threat,
however, can lead to pressure on public officials to settle without a
strike.235 Further, as the Act is drafted, the notice requirement can give
the union the opportunity to time its strike to its advantage, rather than
striking at the conventional time of the contract expiration date. While
the Act seems to contemplate employer agreement for extensions of strike
... See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 188.
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deadlines, it is silent as to what is to occur if the union wants to extend
the strike deadline and the employer does not agree. If the eventual reso-
lution of this question is that the union can withdraw strike notices, the
union would possess the additional weapon of being able to give repeated
notices-forcing the employer each time to ready itself for the strike, only
to have it called off at the eleventh hour. Once again, the Act gives power
to labor organizations that is not available to other groups.
c. EnJoinable Strikes
Strikes by employees other than safety employees may also be partic-
ularly harmful to the community, and thus particularly destructive of the
political process. Examples might be strikes by bridge tenders, waste
treatment plant employees, or garbage collectors. The Act does not pro-
hibit such strikes, but it provides a procedure for enjoining them if they
endanger public health or safety.2 6 The employer may seek a temporary
restraining order from the court of common pleas. The court may grant
the order, but only for a period of up to seventy-two hours.237 During that
time, the employer is to seek authorization from SERB to extend the in-
junction. If the authorization is obtained, the court may enjoin the strike
for up to sixty more days.238 The "price" paid by the employer is a re-
quirement that the employer continue bargaining for the entire sixty
days.23
9
This provision gives some leverage to the employer. By using it, the
employer can reduce its vulnerability to strikes by affecting their timing.
For example, this provision might enable a city to avoid having to suffer a
garbage strike during summer heat waves. The provision may also have
the effect of blunting some of the enthusiasm of public employees for
striking, particularly if the employer lets the strike continue for a period
of time before seeking the injunction. If garbage collectors are off work
for a month, during which time garbage accumulates to the point of pos-
ing a health hazard, and are then called back for sixty-three days to work
on the piles of refuse not collected during their strike, they may not be
especially anxious to go through it all again.
As far as the political process is concerned, the injunction procedure
that applies to strikes that threaten public health or safety does preserve
a degree of political accountability-but only a degree, since such strikes
can be enjoined for just sixty-three days in spite of their impact upon
public health or safety.2 40 In a democratic system it seems anomalous that
a strike that has been held both by SERB and by a court to endanger
... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(A)(Page Supp. 1983).
.7 Id.
238 Id.
.., Id. § 4117.16(B).
240 See id. § 4117.16(A).
[Vol. 33:593
56https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss4/4
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
public health or safety must be allowed to continue.
In this regard, even if other interest groups had the same degree of raw
power as a union to prevent performance of essential public services, the
exercise of that power by those other groups surely would be enjoined.
For example, a union could prevent garbage pickups in summertime by
striking and picketing. A highly organized and motivated group of welfare
mothers might be able to do the same thing by physically blocking gar-
bage trucks from leaving garages. Clearly, the welfare mothers would be
permanently enjoined, and perhaps jailed for interference with public ser-
vices, while the union would be free to start a strike and to recommence it
after, at most, sixty-three days.
3. The Law of the Act in Ohio's Legal System
The Ohio Act provides that collective bargaining agreements are to
govern the terms and conditions of employment of public employees.2 4'
These agreements are subordinate to laws pertaining to civil rights, af-
firmative action, unemployment compensation, worker's compensation,
retirement of public employees, residency requirements, minimum educa-
tional requirements for certain public education employees, and mini-
mum standards promulgated by the state board of education.242 The Ohio
Act itself prevails over any conflicting laws, with the exception of a few
enumerated sections, including arrangements necessary to comply with
requirements of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.241
A request for funds to implement any negotiated agreement, as well as
any other matter requiring legislative approval, is to be submitted for ap-
proval to the legislative body.24 The legislature is to accept or reject the
submission as a whole. If the legislature does not act within thirty days,
the submission is approved.245 This effectively means that an appropria-
tion can be passed without actual approval by the legislative body-and
without any legislator having to make a decision for which he or she may
be held accountable. Also, rejection of a factfinding report by a legislative
body requires a supermajority and must be accomplished before the pub-
lic is even informed of what the legislative body is voting on.2"
241 Id. § 4117.10(A).
242 Id.
14 Id. But see State, ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells, 18 Ohio St. 3d 382 (1985). In
Wells, the Ohio Supreme Court limited this "supremacy clause" to avoid "unreasonable or
absurd consequences." Id. at 384. In refusing to enforce a confidentiality provision of a col-
lective bargaining agreement between the city of Logan, Ohio and its police force, the court
stated that if it were to enforce the provision, "private citizens would be empowered to alter
legal relationships between a government and the public at large via collective bargaining
agreements." Id.
"' OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(B).
2-5 Id.
240 Id. § 4117.14(C)(6).
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Even the safguard of submission to the legislative body is absent if in-
terest arbitration is applicable and is invoked. The statute provides that:
"The issuance of a final offer settlement award constitutes a binding
mandate to the public employer and the exclusive representative to take
whatever actions are necessary to implement the award." '247
Interestingly, there is no distinction between management and union
proposals with regard to the finality of arbitration awards. For example, a
mayor may advance a proposal to a union that both know would not re-
ceive approval from the city council. However, if the union rejects that
offer, goes to arbitration, and "loses," the agreement is immune from leg-
islative disapproval. Converesely, a mayor who has opposition in the
council may be willing to accept a union's final position but would antici-
pate a fight in the council. The mayor could simply refuse to agree to the
union position, go to arbitration, and lose. The mayor thus cannot be
blamed for the agreement, the agreement cannot be rejected, and the
council is bypassed.
4. Synopsis
For the reasons discussed above, it must be concluded that the Act
does not avoid the problem of altering the process of government. As
noted earlier, the results of the altered process in terms of the actual set-
tlements are likely to be acceptable in most cases. In terms of the costs to
public employers, it is likely that the altered process will result in an in-
crease in the strength of claims by public employee unions on employer
funds. Here again, however, the results are not likely to be totally unac-
ceptable. There is, however, another price. It is in the diminution of the
ability of competing and less powerful interest groups to achieve their
goals through the democractic process. The price is in the substitution, in
this single but critically important area, of supposed "equities" for "the
politics of the thing."
V. CONCLUSION
The Act creates a new public employment system for Ohio and its po-
litical subdivisions. In doing so, it has affected the rights of public em-
ployees, the rights of labor organizations, and the political system.
In the area of employee rights, the Act has codified certain rights of
employees that were otherwise enforceable only through constitutional
litigation. Also, it has enabled employees, if they join a labor organization,
to strike and to force their employer to bargain collectively. However, to
the extent that the Act seeks to provide public employees with rights
identical to their private sector counterparts, it does not succeed. Unlike
the NLRA system, the individual rights provided in the Act are in many
" Id. § 4117.14(I).
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cases not exercisable except when the individual acts through an em-
ployee organization.
In the area of union rights, the Act seeks to enhance the position and
rights of unions. In this effort it succeeds. The Act will enable employee
organizations to gain new members, obtain bargaining goals, and receive
financial support from members and nonmembers alike. In turn, this will
increase the power and influence of public employee unions in Ohio.
In the area of the political system, the Act quite simply changes the
rules of the game. Democractic processes now will have only tangential
effects on personnel matters. The main influence will be collective bar-
gaining in which unions can use either a powerful strike weapon or the
even more unchecked power of an arbitrator to achieve their goals. Public
sentiment and voting power can be circumvented. Given the fact that
personnel costs constitute the major portion of almost every public em-
ployer's budget, the effect of the Act upon the democratic process cannot
be taken lightly.
Even if, because they can achieve their goals without striking, unions
do not strike and the Act is thus successful in increasing the level of "la-
bor peace" among Ohio's public employees, other interest groups will lose
power. As more and more issues are taken from the political arena and
made the subject of binding contract provisions, this loss of power will
continue. The Act, therefore, does have a very major cost-the effective
disenfranchisement of competing interest groups. Whether that cost will
be surpassed by the benefits sought by the Act-more public employee
rights, more union power, and more labor peace-is doubtful.
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